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  For most countries, competition law is a relatively recent phenomenon. In 1950, only ten 
jurisdictions had competition laws. Today more than 120 jurisdictions do and more than 80 of 
these systems have commenced since 1980.1 Officials from these jurisdictions now interact 
regularly through networked organizations, such as the International Competition Network 
(ICN) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). There is no binding 
multilateral treaty mandating that countries have a competition law system that prescribes 
certain behavior, or create specialized institutions to enforce these prescriptions, although the 
North American Free Trade Agreement and a number of other free trade agreements signed by 
the United States (US) have short provisions that require countries to adopt and enforce laws 
against anticompetitive business conduct. Yet such prescriptions and institutions now exist in all 
major economies, creating what can be viewed as a transnational legal order, a collection of 
formalized legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the 
understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions.2  
Combating international cartels is one of the central goals of this transnational legal 
order, and there appears to be greater normative convergence on this antitrust issue than any 
other among governments. Countries around the world have increased sanctions against cartels, 
including in many cases adopting criminal sanctions for the first time, with the term cartels now 
commonly harnessed to the unsavory epithet ‘hard core’ to signify cartels engaged in price 
fixing, output limitations, market divisions and bid-rigging.3 More than thirty countries have 
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Hogan Lovells); Spencer Weber Waller is Professor and Director, Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, Loyola 
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Harding, Hugh Hollman, and Robert Kudrle for their comments, and Jennifer Fair, Isaac Swaiman and Mary 
Rumsey for research assistance. All errors are ours. 
1  Rachel Brandenburger, ‘The Many Facets of International Cooperation at the Antitrust Division’ (International 
Bar Association Midyear Conferemce, Madrid, Spain, June 15 2012) < 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/284239.pdf.>; John Fingleton, ‘the International Competition Network: 
Planning for the Second Decade’ (9th Annual ICN Conference, Turkey, April 2010) 
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/closing09.pdf.>. 
2 Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change, (2012) 37 Law and Social Inquiry 229; and 
Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Orders’ in Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer 
(eds), Transnational Legal Orders (Cambridge University Press 2015). 
3 See for example Christopher Harding, ‘Business Collusion as a Criminological Phenomenon: Exploring the Global 
Criminalisation of Business Cartels’ (2006) 14 Critical Criminology 181, 182, 188 : ‘The closing years of the 
century then witnessed an apparent sea change…. Europe, and also jurisdictions elsewhere throughout the world, 
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criminalized cartel conduct in some form. All but five have done so since 1995 and over twenty 
since 2000, and the list is growing.4 Many states have initiated prosecutions, several have 
secured convictions, and a few have imposed jail time for these offenses. Others are significantly 
increasing the amount of fines for cartel behavior, such that they can be viewed in punitive 
terms, whether they are formally of a criminal or administrative law nature. Around sixty 
countries now combine enhanced sanctions with a leniency program pursuant to which the first 
to confess is immunized from public criminal or civil prosecution, adopting a carrot and stick 
approach to destabilizing and deterring cartels.  
There is, in short, a global trend toward enhanced sanctions combined with common 
enforcement techniques. Former US Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal 
Enforcement, Scott Hammond thus proclaimed, ‘[i]n the last two decades, the world has seen the 
proliferation of effective leniency programs, ever-increasing sanctions for cartel offenses, a 
growing global movement to hold individuals criminally accountable, and increased international 
cooperation among enforcers in cartel investigations.’5 Although the US remains the primary 
user of criminal law as an enforcement tool, and the enforcement record outside the US is 
relatively slim, the debate over criminalization is active.6 This debate reflects a general shift in 
government attitudes toward cartels which earlier were viewed in more benign (or even positive 
developmental) terms, since cartels could contribute to price stability and labor peace on account 
of the long-term employment that stable firms with ensured profit margins can offer.7  
This state of affairs raises a series of questions. What spurred the trend toward increased 
sanctioning and criminalization of cartel activity? Has the move been almost entirely driven by 
criminalization evangelists such as the US Department of Justice (DOJ), working unilaterally, 
bilaterally, and through transnational networks? Is the primary explanation cognitive in terms of 
shared norms of being a ‘modern’ regulatory capitalist state, as stressed by global polity theory?8 
Or does the shift simply reflect a rational response to the rise of international cartels operating in 
more than one jurisdiction as part of economic globalization? In other words, is the trend toward 
criminalization a functional response to regulatory difficulties that transcend national borders in 
an economically interdependent world, as rational institutionalist theory stresses? Or are organic, 
bottom-up, national processes also at work? Are we witnessing a change in ideological and 
seemed to be engulfed by a project of criminalization.’. For an excellent book on the phenomenon, see Caron 
Beaton-Wells and Ariel Ezrachi (eds), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies Of An International Regulatory 
Movement (Hart Publishing 2011). 
4 See also Janet L McDavid and Megan Dixon, ‘Antitrust Update: Criminal Antitrust Enforcement in a Down 
Economy’ (2011) Antitrust update, 1011, 1015: ‘There are now over 100 countries with antitrust regimes, and over 
two dozen that have criminalized cartel activity’. Reporting over 20: Caron Beaton-Wells, ‘Cartel Criminalisation 
as Cultural Change: A Report from Findings of a Survey of the Australian Public’ ( Japanese Fair Trade 
Commission 5 October 2010) 6 < http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/international_relations/icn/yokohama-materials/pdf 
/1_3.pdf>. 
5 Scott D Hammond, ‘Criminal Policy Speeches: The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Over the Last 
Two Decades’ (Department of Justice – Antitrust Division 25 February 2010) 1 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/speech-criminal.html>. 
6 Beaton-Wells (n 4) 6.  
7 ‘economic theorists and political leaders of the interwar period had often praised the potential value of cartels’: 
David Gerber, Global Competition Law: Law, Markets and Globalization (Oxford University Press 2010) 178. See 
also Christopher Harding and Julia Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe (Oxford University Press 2010).  
8 For an excellent assessment of different explanations of policy diffusion, see Beth Simmons, Frank Dobbin and 
Geoffrey Garrett (eds), The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2008). 
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moral sensibilities around the globe regarding cartel conduct? What is the impact of formal legal 
change on actual practices within countries, both in terms of government investigations and 
private behavior? What are the mechanisms driving the criminalization of cartel activity and the 
enforcement of anti-cartel policies, and what are the primary obstacles to change? What, in sum, 
does the criminalization trend tell us about transnational legal processes and their limits?9 
This Chapter reviews and assesses trends in the criminalization and enforcement of cartel 
offenses around the world, highlighting their notable features. It notes the change in focus in the 
US toward addressing international cartels in the 1990s, followed by a shift in focus toward 
criminal penalties, including jail time for foreign individuals. The US has advocated these 
changes in international fora, most notably the OECD and the ICN. It has been relatively 
successful in its efforts to convince countries to enhance sanctions against cartel activity, and to 
use new enforcement tools such as leniency programs. We thus note the role of US advocacy in 
these developments. Yet we do not attempt to answer whether the change is rational interest-
based or cognitive, since we find that there is support for both explanations.10 Rather, we focus 
on developments in formal law compared to actual enforcement, the mechanism of diffusion 
through networks, and the challenges posed for formal criminalization policies to be applied. 
Criminalizing competition offenses and actually enforcing those prohibitions are two different 
propositions.  
Part 2 addresses changes in the law—the ‘law on the books’—in a number of 
jurisdictions, starting with the US and the European Union (EU). It highlights the enactment 
around the globe of increasingly severe penalties against cartel activity, and the increased 
adoption of criminal sanctions, which follows the US lead. Part 3 examines enforcement trends 
in the US, the EU, and other countries, starting with the increased focus of US enforcement 
policy on international cartels and on the application of criminal sanctions against individuals. 
Part 4 addresses transnational cooperation efforts in combating cartels, focusing particularly on 
the role of the US-initiated ICN, as well as the ongoing substantive and peer-review work of the 
OECD. Part 5 examines two new developments regarding enforcement techniques, the enhanced 
threat of extradition for cartel activity on account of mutual criminalization, and the proliferation 
of leniency programs to destabilize cartels, which are used as a carrot to complement the stick of 
more severe sanctions. Part 6 addresses the central impediments to these trends, and in particular 
the challenge of obtaining sufficient social and political support for criminalizing cartel activity 
and the impact of different institutional legacies, especially where criminal and competition law 
responsibilities are divided among different authorities.  
 
2. Legal change across countries: the law on the books 
 
2.1 Overview of policy developments 
 
While twenty years ago cartel prosecutions were largely the province of the US DOJ, a 
broad range of countries have now adopted enhanced sanctions against cartel offenses, including 
9 For an analytic framework for assessing transnational legal processes and their impact, see Shaffer (n 2); Halliday 
and Shaffer (n 2). See also Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Bringing International Law Home’ (1998) 35 Houston Law 
Review 623. 
10 To start, rational interest-based responses operate within particular cognitive frames, which affect the policy goals 
pursued. 
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criminal sanctions now being available in over thirty countries. Around thirty-five countries have 
criminalized cartel conduct in some form; most of them since the mid-1990s, and the list is 
growing. We compile these countries as of the end of 2012 in Table 1 at the end of this chapter, 
noting the date of criminalization, the conduct covered, and the sanctions provided. We also 
highlight those countries that appear to be more serious about criminal prosecution in practice, 
although in many cases we do not yet know how sanctions will be applied because of the novelty 
of the legal trend. 
The leader in the move toward enhancing sanctions against cartels has been the US, now 
joined by the EU. Although the EU itself applies only administrative fines to undertakings and 
not individuals, these fines are punitive enough that EU Advocates-General view them as ‘quasi-
criminal,’ and over half of the EU member states have criminalized at least some forms of cartel 
activity. More recently, other OECD countries have followed suit, as have the BRICS—Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa. As John Connor writes, ‘with the adoption of an antitrust 
law in China in 2007, virtually all the world’s leading economies have made cartels illegal.’11 
Whereas cartel activity earlier was not viewed as problematic, and seen as possibly even 
conducive, to national economic development, most leading economies have now significantly 
stiffened sanctions against cartels, reflecting a sense of social opprobrium, at least in the books. 
The trend toward punitive administrative sanctions has facilitated the move toward criminal 
sanctions as an enhanced deterrent.  
Yet scholarly attempts to assess global patterns of criminalization are limited.12 
Christopher Harding rightly notes that any such attempt will necessarily be plagued by problems 
of definition and legislative complexity.13 Some systems, for example, prosecute cartel offenses 
as both administrative and criminal offenses. It thus may be difficult as a practical matter to 
disentangle administrative fines and surcharges from ‘criminal fines.’ The growing trend toward 
‘criminalization’ (broadly construed) also masks crucial differences between jurisdictions. 
Harding concludes that empirical study reveals ‘very much a patchwork of criminalization’ 
involving local legal traits.14 Apart from Canada and the US, little of other countries’ ‘criminal 
legislation pre-dates the 1980s, and much of it has a more partial or tentative character.’15 For 
example, criminal sanctions can be imposed for bid-rigging in Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
and Poland, but such conduct can be viewed as more akin to fraud and thus distinct (for such 
jurisdictions) from that of cartel offenses. In some jurisdictions, only criminal fines may be 
imposed, and in many others, only fines are used in practice, so that they lack the social sanction 
and potential deterrence value of jail time. Canada, for example, prosecutes individuals, but even 
where successful, the individuals typically only receive a conditional sentence pursuant to which 
they provide community service.16 While European, Latin American, and Asian jurisdictions 
have all criminalized competition offenses, ‘there is no systematic pattern.’17  
11 John M Connor, ‘Latin America and the Control of International Cartels’, in Eleanor M Fox & D Daniel Sokol 
(eds), Competition Law and Policy in Latin America (Hart Publishing 2009) 291, 309. 
12 Outside of North America, this feature fits with the general paucity of academic attention to business crime. 
Harding’s 2006 study is directly on point: Harding (n 3) 198.  
13 ibid 189. 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid 190. 
16 Telephone Interview with Department of Justice (US) official (June 10, 2011). 
17 Harding (n 3) 190. 
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Criminalization of cartel conduct is of a recent vintage, and more limited in scope, 
outside the US.18 Harding identified only nine countries in 2006 that are ‘to some extent self-
consciously targeting cartel activity by means of criminal law within the context of the recent 
international campaign against cartels,’ listing Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, 
Norway, the United Kingdom, and the US.19 This figure, however, has increased since then. An 
October 2010 Cartels Workshop organized by the ICN placed the figure at more than twenty 
countries,20 we show that the figure was more than thirty in 2012, and the list is growing.  
 
2.2 US Developments 
   
The US has long been the global leader in aggressively pursuing competition policy.21 
The US first extended the jurisdictional reach of its law to combat foreign-based cartels. As this 
move was insufficient, the US has since attempted to export anti-cartel policies and enforcement 
techniques abroad, in particular through the OECD and the ICN discussed in Part 4. 
The US has criminalized agreements and conspiracies to restrict competition since 1890 
with the passage of the original Sherman Antitrust Act, although it would be over seventy years 
before jail sentences for antitrust violations became common.22 Originally only a misdemeanor, 
violation of the Act became a felony in 1974. The US subjects both corporations and individuals 
to punishment, casting ‘[t]he net … widely in terms of both conduct and persons.’23 Cartel 
participants face large fines, possible imprisonment, and treble damages in civil actions. The 
Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004 significantly increased the 
maximum penalties for antitrust offenses.24 The Act increased the maximum corporate fine from 
$10 million to $100 million; increased the maximum individual fine from $350,000 to $1 
million; and raised the maximum jail sentence from three to ten years. The longest prison 
sentence for an individual to date has been sixty months.25 If the top end of the range applicable 
under the US Sentencing Guidelines exceeds the statutory maximum, then an alternative 
sentencing provision available for federal felonies may be employed which can increase fines to 
18 ibid 190–91.  
19 Ibid 191. 
20 Beaton-Wells (n 4) 6. 
21 Harding (n 3) 190.  
22 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 USC. §§ 1-7 (1982)). The 
Act became law on July 2, 1890. See Donald Baker, ‘Why Is the United States So Different from the Rest of the 
World in Imposing Serious Criminal Sanctions on Individual Cartel Participants?’ (2011) 12 Sedona Conference 
Journal 301, 302-04. See generally John Herling, The Great Price Conspiracy: The Story of the Antitrust 
Violations in the Electric Industry (Greenwood Press 1962): detailing revival of criminal antitrust enforcement 
against nation-wide electrical equipment cartel in the early 1960s. 
23 Harding (n 3) 190.  
24 Pub. L. No. 108-237, 118 Stat. 661(2004) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 USC.). 
25 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Press Release, Former Sea Star Line President Sentenced to Serve Five Years in Prison For 
Role in Price-Fixing Conspiracy Involving Coastal Freight Services Between the Continental United States and 
Puerto Rico, (Dec. 6, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/302027.htm.  
Recently, the Department of Justice secured two-year prison sentences for two Japanese executives – the longest 
sentence of a foreign national who has submitted to the United States’ jurisdiction: Department of Justice, 
‘Antitrust Division Update’ ( Department of Justice Website  2013) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-
update/2013/criminal-program.html.> 
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twice the amount of harm caused or the gains derived.26 The DOJ routinely invokes this 
provision to justify fines in excess of the statutory maximum. The largest criminal fine under this 
provision has been $500 million.27  
The Antitrust Division of the DOJ relies heavily on its amnesty and leniency program in 
its criminal enforcement efforts.28 The amnesty program grants automatic immunity from 
criminal prosecution if an entity or individual reports illegal conduct which the Antitrust 
Division was not previously aware of and truthfully cooperates with the Division in its 
investigation and any resulting prosecution. The cooperating entity must further not have been 
the ringleader of the cartel nor have coerced others to participate. Discretionary immunity or 
reduced sentences and fines are available to entities and individual who cannot meet the full 
criteria set forth above. To further induce cartel offenders to come forward, recent legislation 
also amended the leniency program to limit the civil damages exposure of an amnesty applicant 
from treble damages to the actual damages caused, in addition to providing immunity from 
criminal prosecution.  
 
2.3 EU and EU Member State Developments 
 
Historically, Europe has approached antitrust regulation very differently than the US. 
While the US approach has been characterized by criminalization and treble damage civil claims, 
Europe’s approach had long been administrative, involving a more consensual process which 
was often based on voluntary adoption of practices, and which avoided penal sanctions and 
critical language suggesting moral approbation.29 Europe’s approach began to change in the early 
1980s, and has since become increasingly ‘American’ in its tough-minded approach toward 
cartels, focusing on their adverse economic impact on consumers.30 Although EU authorities are 
still unable to impose prison terms or fine individuals for antitrust violations, and there are 
significant constitutional and institutional limitations on their ability to do so, they have become 
much more aggressive in anti-cartel enforcement and there is now a debate as to the advisability 
of adding a criminal law component to EU competition policy.31 
26 Criminal Fine Improvements Act, Pub. L. No. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279 (1987) (codified as amended at 18 USC 
3571(d) (2006)). We thank Professor Caron Beaton-Wells for this point. 
27 ‘DOJ AU Optronics Corporation Executive Convicted for Role in LCD Price-Fixing Conspiracy’ ( Department of 
Jstice Webstie 18 September 2012) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2012/290399.htm>. AU 
Optronics was fined $500 million, matching the largest fine imposed against a company violating US antitrust 
laws. 
28 Department of Justice (US) ‘Corporate Leniency Policy’ (Department of Justice 1993); Department of Justice 
‘Leniency Policy for Individuals’ (Department of Justice 1994). 
29 Gerber Global Competition Law (n 7) 159–203; see generally David Gerber, Law and Competition in 20th 
Century Europe (Oxford University Press 1998). 
30 Harding (n 3) 186–87. Gerber noting ‘growing confidence in the intellectual foundations of US-style substantive 
law analysis within the [EU] competition directorate’: Gerber Global Competition Law (n 7) 201. 
31 cf Ingeborg Simonsson, ‘Criminalising Cartels in the EU: Is There a Case for Harmonisation’, in Beaton-Wells 
and Ezrachi (eds) (n 3);  Peter Whelan, ‘A Principled Argument for Personal Criminal Sanctions as Punishments 
under EC Cartel Law’ (2007) 4 Competition Law Review 7; Katalin J Cseres and others, Criminalization of 
Competition Law Enforcement: Economic and Legal Implications for EU Member States (Edward Elgar  2006). 
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The EU has significantly increased its penalties for cartel offenses in recent years to the 
extent that EU Advocate-Generals have called them ‘quasi-criminal.’32 EU authorities now can 
assess fines up to 30% of a company’s annual sales in connection with the prohibited activities 
multiplied by the number of years in which the offenses occurred. Fines also now include an 
‘entry fee’—or automatic fixed penalty—of between 15-25% of the participant’s annual sales in 
the affected sector.33 While the fines do not change the maximum penalty – 10 per cent of a 
company’s total turnover in the preceding business year (whether or not in connection with the 
prohibited activity – the revisions make it more likely that the fines will approach that limit.34  
Among the more significant developments in the EU are the refinement of its leniency program 
in 2006 and the establishment of its cartel settlement procedure in June 2008, in both cases 
following the US lead.35 The leniency program, unlike the US model, is not backed by the threat 
of criminal sanction. Yet the program has proven crucial to uncovering cartels in Europe, with 
the majority of cases in recent years stemming from evidence obtained from a leniency 
applicant.36 The settlement procedure is designed to streamline the EU’s handling of cartel cases 
and thus free resources for new investigations. The alleged cartelist is able to review the EU’s 
evidence against it and determine whether to acknowledge its involvement and accept liability 
for violations of EU competition law in EU territory. Cooperating parties receive an automatic 
10% reduction in penalties pursuant to the settlement program, but can obtain full immunity if 
they are the first to confess pursuant to the leniency program.  
The European Commission, through its Directorate-General for Competition (DG Comp), 
and EU national competition authorities established the European Competition Network (ECN) 
in 2004 to increase cooperation between EU and national authorities, and more effectively share 
enforcement tasks.37 The underlying regulation also strengthened authorities’ investigatory 
powers by, for example, establishing their right to seal business premises and books or records, 
and to interview persons who may have useful information.38 The ECN has helped competition 
32 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-97/08, Akzo Nobel NV and Others v. Commission of the European 
Communities [2009] ECR I-8237, 39: ‘The consequence of the sanctionative nature of measures imposed by 
competition authorities for punishing cartel offences - in particular fines - is that the area is at least akin to criminal 
law.’; Joined Opinions of Mr. Advocate General Vesterdorf, Case T-1/89, Rhone-Poulenc SA v. Commission 
[1991] ECR II-867, 3: referring to the ‘substance of the [competition] cases, which all broadly exhibit the 
characteristics of a criminal law case’. See also, noting the punitive and quasi-criminal nature of the penalties 
involved, Philip Marsden, ‘Checks and Balances: EU Competition Law and the Rule of Law’ (2009) 22 Loyola 
Consumer Law Review 51, 55. 
33 European Commission (EC) Guidelines On The Method Of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant To Article 23(2)(A) 
Of Regulation No 1/2003 [2006] OJ C210 2. 
34 Gary R. Spratling & D Jarrett Arp, ‘International Cartel Investigations: Evaluating Options and Managing Risk in 
Multi-Jurisdictional Criminal Antitrust Investigations’ [2010] Antitrust Counseling & Compliance 229, 241–43, 
338 <1788 PLI/Corp 229>. 
35 Harding and Joshua (n 7) 243; Commission Regulation (EC) 622/2008 amending Regulation (EC) No. 773/2004, 
as regards the conduct of Settlement Procedures in cartel cases [2008] OJ L171/3. 
36 See Edmond noting that all cases adopted in 2010 were via immunity applications: Charlotte Edmond, ‘For 
Whom the Whistle Blows’ (Legal Week 22 Sept  2011). See also Alan Riley, ‘The Modernisation of EU Anti-
Cartel Enforcement: Will the Commission Grasp the Opportunity?’ (Special Report, Center for European Policy 
Studies January 2010) 5 <http://aei.pitt.edu/14570/1/Modernisation_Final_e-version.pdf.>. 
37 Stephen Wilks, ‘The European Competition Network: what has changed?’ (Paper for EUSA Conference, 
Montreal, 17-19 May 2007) <http://aei.pitt.edu/8067/1/wilks%2Ds%2D08h.pdf>. 
38 See Chavez (n 16) 964–65. See also Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 On the Implementation of the Rules on 
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, arts. 19, 20, [2003] OJ L 1, 14-15. 
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policy gain stature throughout the EU, and enhanced the authority of the DG Comp and the 
National Competition Authorities.39 
The major focus of sanctions for EU member state authorities likewise is the imposition 
of administrative fines against corporate enterprises, embedded in a juridical framework.40 
Starting in the late 1990s, and increasing more recently, however, some EU member states have 
begun to embark on a criminalization project. Over half of the EU member states now 
criminalize certain cartel offenses, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain 
and the United Kingdom, and the list appears to be growing, although Austria, the Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg have decriminalized competition law (except for bid-rigging in Austria).41 As 
discussed in Part 3, however, how such criminalization initiatives will operate in practice 
remains in question as the policies remain circumscribed compared to the US model. 
 
2.4 Developments in other Countries 
 
In recent years, a wide range of other jurisdictions, at least formally, provide jail time for 
cartel offenses. Individuals now face potential imprisonment for cartel activity in Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, Norway, Russia, Thailand, and Zambia, 
in addition to in the US and a majority of EU member states. Moreover, cartel participants are 
subject to complementary private civil damage actions in a growing number of countries, 
including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand, as well as in Belgium, Germany, 
Ireland, and the United Kingdom within the European Union.  
The global trend is toward providing for enhanced sanctions against cartels. Many OECD 
members (in addition to the US and EU member states) have stiffened penalties for engaging in 
cartel activities, which vary in their civil/administrative or criminal law nature. For example, 
Canada’s Budget Implementation Act of 2009 substantially changed the criminal enforcement 
regime for cartel offenses by raising the maximum penalty from 5 to 14 years in prison and the 
maximum fine from $10 to $25 million. Price-fixing, market allocation, and output restrictions 
are now per se offenses under the law.42 And as of early 2012, an individual convicted and 
sentenced to prison under certain provisions of the act no longer enjoys the prospect of serving 
his or her sentence in the community.43 Australia recently increased maximum fines to the 
39 Gerber (n 7) 190, 200. 
40 Ibid 182. In addition the European Union has issued a directive requiring member states to enact effective private 
damage remedies for competition violations into national law by the end of 2016.   DIRECTIVE 2014/104/EU OF 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing 
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member 
States and of the European Union, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0104&from=EN. 
41 Stating that more than half of all EU member states have some form of criminal sanctions for some forms of cartel 
conduct:  Philipp Girardet, ‘“What if Uncle Sam wants you?”: Principles and Recent Practice Concerning US 
Extradition Requests in Cartel Cases’ (2010) 1 Journal of European Competition Law and Practice  286, 287; 
Wouter Wils, ‘Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer’ in Cseres and Others (n 33) 60, 74. 
42 Spratling and Arp (n 36) 250; Bill C-10, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in 
Parliament on 27 January, 2009 and related to fiscal measures, 2nd Sess., 40th Parl., 2009 [hereinafter Bill C-10]. 
Bill C-10 became S.C. 2009, c. 2 upon passage through Parliament. 
43 Elisa Kearney and others, ‘Canadian Government Restricts Availability of Conditional Sentences (“House 
Arrest”)’ Mondaq  (20 March 2012) 
  
                                                 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2288871
 9 
greater of $10 million or three times the value of the benefit derived from the cartel. Where value 
cannot be determined, the law provides for a fine of 10% of annual turnover.44 In 2009, the 
Australian Parliament criminalized various cartel offenses, providing for up to 10 years in prison 
and a fine of $220,000 (Aus), and New Zealand is in the process of following Australia in this 
respect.45 In the summer of 2009, Japan increased criminal sanctions for cartel offenses, 
changing its maximum prison sentence for cartel conduct or bid-rigging from three to five years. 
Japan also raised the statute of limitations from three to five years, and restructured its new 
leniency program.46 In 2005, Korea likewise revised its competition laws to increase fines 
against cartel participants from a maximum of 5% to a maximum of 10% of sales in related 
goods or services, and to facilitate use of a leniency program.47 More recently, in 2011, Mexico’s 
Congress approved a new law introducing criminal sanctions of up to ten years in prison for 
collusion, as well as the ability to engage in surprise inspections, known as ‘dawn raids.’48 Even 
Switzerland, ‘where cartels were “endemic” to the economy,’ has recently passed a law 
providing for administrative fines of up to 10% of a firm’s total combined revenue for the 
preceding three years.49  
The BRIC countries have also stiffened penalties for engaging in cartel activities. Brazil 
has emerged as the new leader in Latin America in combating cartels. Since 2003, Brazil’s 
competition system has eliminated overlapping functions, streamlined cartel investigations, and 
enhanced authorities’ enforcement tools through granting them the power to conduct ‘dawn 
raids’ and to use the leverage provided by new leniency and settlement programs.50 Federal and 
state prosecutors conduct cartel prosecutions, in cooperation with the agencies forming part of 
the Brazilian Competition Policy System (BCPS).51 The BCPS’s anti-cartel program has grown 
steadily, especially since 2006.52 Brazil’s program for criminally prosecuting cartels is recently 
among ‘the most active of all countries,’ and includes fines and prison sentences ranging from 
two to five years.53 Brazil’s leniency program, created in 2000, offers full immunity to the first 
cartelist to confess, or partial immunity where enforcers were already aware of the cartel. Brazil 
<http://www.mondaq.com/canada/x/169312/Antitrust+Competition/Canadian+Government+Restricts+Availabilit
y>. 
44 Spratling and Arp (n 36) 243. 
45 A bill imposing criminal sanctions for cartel behavior was introduced into parliament in October 2011. Commerce 
(Cartels and Other Matters) Amendment Bill, 2011 No. 341-1, Digest No. 1942 (Oct. 13, 2011) 
<http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/C9A80483-8096-4CCF-941C-
E2B346E6C844/208630/1942Commerce1.pdf >: criminalizing price fixing, output restrictions, market allocation 
and bid rigging, and providing criminal penalties of, inter alia, up to seven years imprisonment for an individual. 
See also Chavez (n 16) 965–66; Ministry of Economic Development, ‘New Zealand, Cartel Criminalisation 
Discussion Document’ (Ministry of Economic Development (NZ) 2010) 
<http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/70683/Cartel-Criminalisation.pdf.>. 
46 Spratling and Arp ( n36) 252, 309–10. 
47 ibid 243, 311. 
48 ‘Monopolies in Mexico: Compete – Or Else’ (Economist 7 May 2011) 41. See also Omar Guerrero Rodríguez and 
Alan C Ramírez, ‘Mexican Competition Law Aligned Incentives for Effective Cartel Enforcement’ (Competition 
Policy International, October 2012) <https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Uploads/Cartel-
Oct2012-Omar3.pdf>. 
49 Chavez (n 16) 943. 
50 OECD ‘Competition Law and Policy in Brazil: A Peer Review’ (OECD 2010) 7. 
51 ibid 7, 37. 
52 ibid 14–15. 
53 ibid 18. See also Spratling and Arp ( n36) 253. 
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also introduced a Cartel Settlement Program under which competition authorities enter into 
settlements with companies that lost the race to apply for leniency. The settlement program led to 
a number of settlements since 2007.54 Brazil has emerged as a regional expert in anti-cartel 
enforcement—having recently shared its growing expertise with Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and 
El Salvador.55 Brazil’s competition authorities regularly engage in bilateral training and 
consultations with other national authorities.  
Among the other BRICs, China’s new anti-monopoly law went into effect in 2008, and in 
the summer of 2009, China’s industry and commerce agency announced new procedures 
governing antitrust investigations and enforcement.56 China’s Anti-Monopoly Law does not 
expressly provide for criminal penalties, but other criminal law provisions can and have been 
used against cartel participants (such as for ‘obstruction’ of justice).57 Similarly, under a law 
effective in late 2009, Russia now applies criminal sanctions for antitrust violations, and certain 
offenses are punishable by up to six years imprisonment.58 In India, ‘after a long and troubled 
gestation,’59 a new competition act began to take effect in 2009 which stiffens sanctions, 
including fines of up to 10 percent of an enterprise’s turnover,60 and prison terms for obstruction 
of justice.61 Sometimes associated as one of the expanded ‘BRICS,’ South Africa also in 2009 
enacted criminal liability for directors and managers for certain competition law offenses,62 and 
has now created a cartel division within its enforcement agency.63 The impact of these legal 
changes, however, remains an open question in many countries for the reasons we discuss in Part 
6. 
 
3. Enforcement trends across countries 
  
3.1 Overview of policy developments 
 
The prevalence of cartels is difficult to measure. Conspiracies are meant to go 
undetected, and many, of course, do. Yet because of more robust law enforcement tools and 
shifting attitudes about cartels, authorities are detecting more cartels than in the past. While 
many countries have law on the books, to what extent do different jurisdictions effectively 
enforce those laws? Answering this question is difficult. As Harding observed, it is still too early 
54 OECD (n 52) 17. 
55 ibid 50–51. 
56 Brendan Pierson, ‘China Adopts New Rules to Enforce Monopoly Law’ (Law  360 9 June  2009) 
<http://www.law360.com/articles/105392/china-adopts-new-rules-to-enforce-monopoly-law> 
57 Jonathan Gowdy, ‘China Issues New Anti-Monopoly Rules and Procedures on Pricing Conduct’ Mondaq (20 
January 2011) <http://www.mondaq.in/article.asp?articleid=120258>; Martyn Huckerby and others, China's 
Antitrust Tigers Grow Teeth Mondaq (1 September 2010) 
<http://www.mondaq.com/x/108988/Trade+Regulation+Practices/Chinas+Antitrust+Tigers+Grow+Teeth>. 
58 Spratling and Arp ( n36) 254. 
59 Aditya Bhattacharjea, ‘India's New Competition Law: A Comparative Assessment (2008) 4 Journal of 
Competition Law and Eocnomics 609, 609. 
60 The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 of 2003, art. 27. 
61 ibid art 42. See also Bhattacharjea, (n 61) 626.  
62 Competition Amendment Act of 2009 § 16 (S. Afr.). However, the Amendment Act provides that the President 
can determine when it enters into force; as of the beginning of 2015, it had not yet come into force. 
63 Noting appointment of official to the “newly established Cartels Division”: ‘Commission Appoints Head of Cartel 
Unit’ (AllAfrica.com 6 May 2011). 
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to assess the impact of ‘the enforcement of criminal law relating to cartels, when so much of this 
is of recent origin,’ but ‘some indications at a more general and comparative level [suggest] that 
implementation and enforcement [do] not match the rhetoric of law enactment.’64  
Scholars and policymakers have attempted to get at the enforcement question in different 
ways. Economist John Connor has collected empirical data on enforcement in a large multi-
jurisdictional sample.65 The ICN and OECD offer survey evidence regarding the perspectives of 
cartel authorities.66 Critically, however, empirical work on cartel enforcement can measure only 
detected cartels. One must therefore bear in mind that any conclusions drawing from this 
empirical work inevitably suffer from selection bias. Methodological difficulties 
notwithstanding, the overall global trend is toward enhanced enforcement, including higher fines 
and an increased emphasis on individual accountability with a view toward deterrence, although 
the level of enforcement varies significantly by jurisdiction as does its deterrent value.  
Connor undertook, to our knowledge, the first attempt to assess quantitatively, using a 
large multi-jurisdictional sample, the magnitude and pattern of global antitrust sanctions imposed 
against ‘international cartels,’ by which he refers to cartels involving members from more than 
one country.67 Connor presents data on such cartels discovered from 1990–2005 in a 2006 study, 
and maintains an annually-updated database of all publicly reported sanctions. He selects 1990 as 
a date that roughly captures the beginning of the current level of sanctions and the harmonization 
of antitrust laws among the US, EU, and Canada. From 1990 to 2005, authorities took a total of 
387 legal actions against 260 international cartels. Legal action includes ‘the launching of an 
official investigation, the filing of a private antitrust damages suit, or the imposition of one or 
more legal sanctions.’68 The US, Europe, and Canada commenced the vast majority of these 
legal actions—128, 101 (including action by both EU member states and the EU) and 56, 
respectively. In contrast, only seventeen actions were initiated in Asia, and only two in Latin 
America, against international cartels during this period. Authorities secured a total of 285 
‘convictions’ in these cases, which Connor defines to include consent decrees, settlement 
agreements, and warnings. He concludes that the data suggests that ‘antitrust authorities are by 
and large cautious about opening formal investigations in the sense that 90–95% of the cases 
investigated conclude with sanctions of some sort.’69  
64 Harding (n 3) 190, 192. 
65 See for example John M Connor, ‘Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels’ (2006) 6 
Journal of Industrial Competition and Trade 195.  
66 ICN, ‘Trends and Developments in Cartel Enforcement’ (9th Annual ICN Conference, Istanbul, Turkey, 29 April 
2010) (hereafter ‘ICN Trends’]. The survey highlights six recent changes impacting cartel enforcement across the 
globe: (1) increased penalties, (2) changes in investigative powers, (3) new violation provisions or new definitions 
of what constitutes cartel offenses, other significant changes or development, (4) changes in leniency programs, 
(5) shifting perceptions of the importance of cartel enforcement, and (6) the use of the ICN’s Cartel Enforcement 
Manual to advance cartel enforcement. Forty-three of forty-six respondents to the ICN survey, for example, noted 
that increased penalties have impacted cartel enforcement in that jurisdiction in the last ten years—the highest of 
any reported factor. Thirty-five respondents pointed to enhanced investigative powers and leniency provisions as a 
major development.  
67 Connor, ‘Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions’ (n 67) 197.  
68 ibid 199. 
69 Connor derived the 90-95% figure in view of the fact that of 102 legal actions without convictions, 81 were still 
underway at the time of publication and only 21 were dismissed: ibid 200.  
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More recently, Connor updates and summarizes the data through 2008 with a view to 
uncovering trends across countries over time.70 Between January 1990 and November 2008, he 
finds that there were 516 ‘formal official investigations’ of suspected international cartels around 
the world, meaning that there were 129 new formal investigations (516-387) between 2005 and 
2008 alone.71 This figure regarding ‘investigations’ includes cartels that were subject to raids, 
grand jury hearings, class actions, and indictments. At least 6,000 companies have been alleged 
or proven to be members of international cartels, including about 2,900 ultimate parent 
companies with known names and locations. At least 1,620 corporations have been fined.72 
These cartels alone affected a total of around $16 trillion in sales, with the largest number trading 
in industrial goods, followed by business and consumer services.73 Connor finds that the trend 
across countries toward increased discovery of international cartels is pronounced, with rates of 
discovery being fifteen times higher in 2005–2008 than before 1994, and having steadily 
increased between those dates.74  
Enforcement patterns vary widely among states and regions. The number of indictments 
in the US and Canada peaked in the late 1990s, although this shift could suggest that past 
enforcement efforts and the use of criminal sanctions have been successful deterrents. At the 
same time, the severity of applied US sanctions has increased.75 In parallel, the EU has 
commenced an increasingly large number of cases, resulting in increasingly high sanctions. 
National competition authorities within the EU have been the biggest prosecutors of international 
cartels since 2000, and collectively they surpass all other agencies in terms of the number of 
international cartels uncovered.76 Other regions have also engaged in increased cartel 
enforcement, although cartel detections in Africa, Asia and Latin America are comparatively 
modest.77  
Total global penalties assessed against international cartels from 1990 to 2008 are 
approximately $63.3 billion.78 Government fines account for more than half of this total ($35 
billion), though private settlements stemming from civil suits (particularly from the US) are also 
significant, totaling approximately $29 billion.79 The European Commission has imposed the 
vast bulk of global fines, followed by national competition authorities within the EU, the US 
DOJ, and US state Attorneys General.80 Far behind the US and EU, Korea leads the rest of the 
world in terms of fines imposed (with approximately $750 million), followed by Africa (less 
70 John M Connor, ‘Cartels & Antitrust Portrayed: Private International Cartels from 1990 to 2008’ (American 
Antitrust Institution, Working Paper No. 09-06, 2009), 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1535131>. 
71 For about 20% of the cartels, no adverse government decision or private settlement had been reached at the time 
of his review. Investigations in 32 of the 516 were closed without sanctions because of insufficient evidence. 
Email from John Connor (6 June 2011). 
72 Connor '1990 to 2008' (n 72) 5, 25. 
73 ibid 7, 12–14. 
74 ibid 18. 
75 ibid 17.  
76 ibid 8–9, 17, 20–21. 
77 See also ibid 17.  
78 ibid 51. 
79 ibid. 
80 ibid 55. 
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than $500 million), Latin America (approximately $300 million), other Asian countries, and 
Oceania, each with less than half of the Latin American total.81  
Individuals increasingly risk being held accountable, especially in the US.82 At least 435 
individual executives have been penalized, and 989 charged worldwide as of December 2008.83 
Americans account for nearly one third of all penalized executives.84 Although the number of 
individuals charged in the US fluctuated between 1990–2008, the likelihood of sentences has 
become greater and the amount of fines and length of prison sentences have become increasingly 
severe since 1990.85 The US however, remains ‘almost unique’ when it comes to prison 
sentences: only Israel is another significant jurisdiction in that respect, followed by Japan.86  
 
3.2 US Developments 
   
The US has historically taken the global lead in cartel enforcement. In the last two 
decades, it has done so regarding international cartels and has increasingly focused on criminal 
sanctions since the late 1990s, including incarceration of foreign defendants.87 The US reports 
that it has imposed more than 90% of fines in the past few years in connection with the 
prosecution of international cartel activity.88  
The result has been increasing US prosecution of foreign defendants. Connor’s data 
shows that in the US, ‘prior to 1995, less than 2% of corporations accused of criminal price 
fixing were foreign-based firms; after 1997, more than 50% were non-US corporations.’89 The 
DOJ is typically investigating about fifty international cartels at any one time.90 Total annual 
criminal fines increased dramatically starting in 1997, with a record of $1.1 billion in FY 1999.91 
Total criminal fines again exceeded $1 billion in 2009 and 2012.92 Though the DOJ does not 
target particular geographic regions or industry sectors, recent years have seen particularly robust 
enforcement against Asian corporations. Since 2005, the DOJ has imposed cartel fines of $10 
million or greater on more companies headquartered in Asia than on those headquartered in 
every other country combined.93  
The Antitrust Division of the DOJ emphasizes ‘that the most effective way to deter and 
punish cartel activity is to hold culpable individuals accountable by seeking jail sentences.’94 As 
81 These figures are approximate. See ibid 71. 
82 ibid 80–97. 
83 ibid 83–84.  
84 ibid 82. 
85 ibid 88–96 
86 ibid 82. 
87 John M Connor, ‘Global Antitrust Prosecutions of International Cartels: Focus on Asia’ (2008) 31 World 
Competition  575, 582. As noted above, Congress made violation of the Sherman Act a felony, rather than a 
misdemeanor, in 1974. There were some minor criminal domestic cases in the 1980s which helped lay the 
groundwork for the major international cases in the 1990s. We thank Spencer Waller for stressing this point. 
88 Chavez (n 16) 945. 
89 Connor, ‘’Focus on Asia’ (n 89) 588.  
90 Hammond (n 5) 3. 
91 Chavez (n 16) 959–60. 
92 ibid. See also Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, ‘Spring 2012 Update’(Department of Justice (US) 2012) 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2012/criminal-program.html.>. 
93 Ron Knox, ‘The Longer Arm of the Law’ (Global Competition Review 2 October 2012) 
<http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/features/article/32398/the-longer-arm-law/. > 
94 Hammond (n 5) 11. 
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one US official states, ‘our defendants routinely offer to pay large fines in lieu of going to jail, a 
plea that we reject, but they don’t offer to go to jail in lieu of paying a large fine.’95 Connor 
reports that the DOJ secured prison sentences for a total of 284 individuals in cartel cases from 
1990–2007, of which an increasing number and proportion are foreigners.96 Since May 1999, 
nearly fifty foreign defendants have served or are serving prison sentences in the US for 
international cartel offenses or obstructing a cartel investigation.97 The percentage of defendants 
sentenced to jail in cartel cases, and the number of individuals per corporate defendant, have 
increased. The 1990s saw an average of 37% of defendants involve a jail sentence, whereas the 
2009 average was 80%.98 Sentences are also getting harsher.99 The DOJ achieved its highest 
average jail sentence for all defendants in fiscal year 2007, with an average sentence of thirty-
one months. That same year, it imposed a record of 31,391 total jail days against individuals, 
mostly pursuant to guilty pleas.100  
 
3.3 The Vitamins Cases and their Impact 
  
In the late 1990s, the US took the lead in a landmark case that had a significant impact on 
global anti-cartel practices. The ensuing cases in multiple jurisdictions illustrated the potentially 
grave consequences of cartel conduct for businesses, the public, and regulators. The prosecutions 
received significant media attention. The vitamins case grew out of the earlier lysine cartel which 
was captured on live video thanks to the informant Mark Whitaker, later portrayed in the 2009 
motion picture ‘The Informant!’, starring Matt Damon. As US Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General Scott Hammond has observed, ‘the prosecution of the vitamin cartel … helped [to] 
trigger a rethinking of the adequacy of competition laws around the world.’101 
The vitamins cases began with a federal class action complaint in Alabama and a federal 
grand jury investigation in Texas. The December 1997 Alabama complaint alleged a conspiracy 
among the three major vitamins manufacturers to fix prices and allocate sales.102 In May 1999, 
the DOJ announced plea agreements involving major pharmaceutical manufacturer F Hoffmann-
LaRoche Ltd and the German chemical manufacturer BASF Aktiengesellschaft. Stretching more 
than nine years, the conspiracy affected more than $5 billion in commerce. The government’s 
95 R Hewitt Pate, ‘Criminal Policy Speeches: International Anti-Cartel Enforcement’ (Department of Justice – 
Antitrust Division 21 November 2004) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/speech-criminal.html> . We 
thank Bob Kudrle for this. 
96 John Connor, ‘Anti-Cartel Enforcement by the DOJ: An Appraisal’ (2008) 5 Competition Law Review 89, 111 .  
97 observing further that 102 US citizens have been sentenced to prison terms for cartel activity since 1999: Gregory 
J Werden and others , ‘ Criminal Policy Speeches: Recidivism Eliminated: Cartel Enforcement in the United States 
Since 1999’ (Department of Justice (US) – Antitrust Division 22 September 2011) 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/speech-criminal.html> 4-5: see also Hammond (n 5) 7. 
98 ibid 8; see also Connor ‘Anti-Cartel Enforcement by the DOJ’ (n 98) 111: noting the rise in the average number of 
individuals receiving prison sentences between 1990 and 2007. 
99 Noting an average of 8 months imprisonment between 1990-1999, a 19-month average between 2000-2009, and a 
24-month average in 2010-2011: Department of Justice (US) Antitrust Division, ‘Spring 2012 Update’ 
(Department of Justice (US) 2012) <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2012/criminal-
program.html> .  
100 Hammond (n 5) 7–8. See also Connor ‘Anti-Cartel Enforcement by the DOJ’ (n 98) 111: noting the increasing 
harshness of prison sentences. 
101 Hammond (n 5) 9–10. 
102 See Harry First, ‘The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International Competition Law’ 
(2001) 68 Antitrust Law Journal 711, 713–14. 
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sentencing recommendation detailed an ‘extremely well organized operation,’ involving at least 
quarterly meetings and once a year meetings among high-level corporate officials to set an 
annual ‘budget’, and project global sales volumes and prices. The conspirators’ efforts to conceal 
the plot were extensive, including the destruction of most documents after meetings and the 
disguising of conspirators’ identities in those documents not destroyed.103 
Prosecutions in multiple countries followed the US litigation. In the end, the corporate 
cartelists agreed to pay unprecedented fines, globally totaling well over $3 billion (in June 2010 
USD). This total breaks down as follows: in the US, $900 million in criminal fines and over $1.1 
billion in civil settlements; in the European Union, €790.5 million in fines; in Canada, $94.7 
million (Can.) in fines and a $132.2 million national class action settlement; in Australia, $26.5 
million (Aus.) in fines and a $30.5 million (Aus.) class action settlement (the first in 
Australia);104 in Brazil, R$17.6 million in fines.105  
The US DOJ criminally prosecuted twelve corporations and fourteen individuals. Eleven 
executives, including six Europeans, went to prison in the US. It was ‘the first time a foreign 
executive agreed to serve time in US prison for his participation in an international cartel.’106 
While other jurisdictions imposed then-record national fines (Canada, EU, Australia, and Korea, 
for example), only the US imposed jail time. Overall, the vitamins prosecution resulted in greater 
attention to anti-cartel enforcement around the globe, and spurred the DOJ to increase 
international anti-cartel cooperative efforts, as discussed in Part 4. 
 
3.4 EU and EU member state developments 
 
The EU initially tended to follow the US lead in sanctions against international cartels. 
The EU’s fines in cases involving the lysine, citric acid, vitamins, sodium gluconate, and 
graphite electrodes cartels lagged behind prosecutions in the US by two to five years.107 For 
example, the US DOJ announced its first indictment in the citric acid conspiracy in 1996, 
whereas the EU announced its decision in that case in 2001.  
Over time, however, the EU has steadily become more active in investigating and 
sanctioning cartels. Although the EU itself still does not impose a criminal law sanction for cartel 
activity, it has been increasingly aggressive in seeking large administrative fines. Many EU 
cartel prosecutions involve activity only in EU territory, whereas most of the US cases involve 
international or global cartels (that is, cartels involving perpetrators in more than one country, or 
foreign cartels whose activities have effects in more than one continent), suggesting two things. 
One, that the EU still faces significantly greater cartel activity within its own territory108 and, 
two, that the US continues to engage in a more active extraterritorial approach to enforcement, 
on the other.  
There has been ‘an explosion of enforcement’ against cartels in Europe since the mid-
1990s, linked once more to the use of leniency programs.109 Over 90% of EU fines against 
103 See ibid 714–15. 
104 Connor, ‘Focus on Asia’ (n 89) 594. 
105 Chavez (n 16) 936–37. 
106 Hammond (n 5) 7. 
107 Chavez (n 16) 960. 
108 For example, Connor notes that more than half of discovered cartels operated within Europe: Connor, 
‘Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions’ (n 67) 9.  
109 Harding and Joshua (n 7) 145. 
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cartels have been imposed since 1995.110 The EU overtook the US in 1999 in terms of the 
amount of fines imposed. As of 2009, the EU had investigated more than 4,300 companies and 
penalized more than 1,550 of them with most penalties paid by European firms.111 And those 
figures continue to grow.112 Fines totaled €1.756 billion in 2001 and a record €3.334 billion in 
2007. In 2012, the EU secured the highest cartel fine to date: approximately €1.471 billion in 
connection with the TV and computer monitor tubes cartel.113 Indeed, the amount in fines 
collected by the EU in recent years is many times the amount collected by the Antitrust Division 
of the DOJ (although it must be recalled that the DOJ also uses criminal sanctions, and the US 
system also includes more extensive private domestic damage suits).114 
On 19 May 2010, the EU announced its first settlement under its 2008 settlement 
procedure, pursuant to which ten producers of Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) 
chips, agreed to pay a total of € 331,273,800 in fines.115 Participants received a 10% settlement 
discount for admitting fault and adhering to settlement procedures. Sixteen settlements have thus 
far been reached under the 2008 procedure.116 
A few EU member states now impose criminal sanctions against cartels under domestic 
law, although a number limit criminal sanctions to the offence of bid rigging. Between October 
2005 and December 2009, the Irish competition authority had secured thirty-three criminal 
convictions for cartel participants, although no one has gone to jail as the courts have uniformly 
suspended the prison sentences.117 This figure includes the first prison sentence in Europe for a 
non-bid rigging offense, a six-month suspended sentence for the central figure in a cartel 
involving the home heating oil industry.118 Ireland prosecuted a total of twenty-four individuals, 
and secured eighteen convictions, in connection with that cartel.119 Although Germany has only 
criminalized the offense of bid rigging, it indicted over 260 persons for this offense during the 
first eleven years of the statute (between 1998 and 2008), and more than 180 of these individuals 
were convicted, many of whom are serving jail time.120 Even in tiny Estonia, authorities initiated 
110 Connor, ‘Focus on Asia’ (n 89) 589. 
111 Connor, ‘Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions’ (n 67) 50. 
112 See generally European Commission ‘Cartel Cases’(European Commission Website) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/cases/cases.html.> 
113 European Commission, ‘Statistics’ (European Commission  5 December 2012) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf .>. 
114 Compare ibid with Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, ‘Spring 2012 Update’(Department of Justice 2012) 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/division-update/2012/criminal-program.html>. See also Spratling and Arp ( 
n36)  237. 
115 James Kanter, ‘An Old Chip Cartel Case Is Brought to a Swift End’ New York times (20 May 2010) B13. 
116 For example European Commission , ‘Antitrust: Commission Fines Producers of Water Management Products 
€13 million in Sixth Cartel Settlement’ (European Commission Website June 27, 2012) (IP/2/704); European 
Commission ‘Antitrust: Commission Fines Producers of Washing Powder €315.2 Million in Cartel Settlement 
Case’ ( European Commission Website 13 April 2011) (IP/11/473); European Commission, ‘Antitrust: 
Commission Fines DRAM Producers €331 Million for Price Cartel, Reaches First Settlement in a Cartel Case’ 
(European Commission Website 19 May 2010) (IP/10/586). 
117 Patrick Massey and John D Cooke, ‘Competition Offences in Ireland: The Regime and its Results’, Beaton-Wells 
and Ezarchi (n 3) 120. 
118 ibid 122; Spratling and Arp ( n36) 251. The conviction came in the Spring of 2006. 
119 ‘Manager of Galway heating oil company sentenced for price-fixing’, Irish Times (May 4, 2012)  
<http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2012/0504/1224315591378.html.>  
120 Florian Wagner-von Papp, ‘What If All Bid-Riggers Went To Prison and Nobody Noticed? Criminal Antitrust 
Law Enforcement in Germany’, in Beaton-Wells and Ezarchi (n 3)158. 
  
                                                 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2288871
 17 
eight criminal cases in 2009, three of which were referred to the public prosecutor for court 
proceedings. Estonia continues to prosecute several cartel cases each year and has been aided by 
its adoption of a leniency program in 2010.121 
Finally, the United Kingdom (UK) has begun to prosecute cartelists under its 2002 
Enterprise Act. The 2007 marine hose prosecution was the first price fixing case brought under 
the 2002 law, and resulted in the first criminal sanctions ever imposed for competition law 
violations in the United Kingdom. The U.K. sentenced three executives involved in the marine 
hose conspiracy to prison terms of thirty, twenty-four, and twenty months, following a US plea 
bargain (which made the prosecution much easier and the case thus unique).122 Soon after, in 
August 2008, the government charged four current and former British Airways executives with 
fixing prices of fuel surcharges for passenger flights.123 That trial, however, collapsed in 2010 
after a series of procedural and evidentiary failings on the part of the prosecution.124 Many 
commentators view this episode as a severe setback for the criminalization agenda in the UK, 
calling into question its viability.125 Wide-ranging reforms to the UK antitrust regime came into 
effect in 2014, including the creation of a new competition body and refinements to the 
definition of cartel activity that may facilitate future prosecutions.126 
 
3.5 Developments in other countries  
 
Other countries around the world have adopted new competition laws to combat cartels, 
reorganized their national competition agencies and devoted more resources to anti-cartel 
enforcement. These changes are certainly encouraged, if not catalyzed, by increasing 
transgovernmental exchange among national antitrust authorities within a particular normative 
framework which portrays global cartel conspirators as evil, contemptuous of the law, and 
121 Estonian Competition Authority, ‘Annual Report 2010’ (Estonian Competition Authority 2010) 
<http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/public/AnnualReports_/ANNUAL_REPORT_2010_ECA.pdf>; Estonian 
Competition Authority, ‘Annual Report 2009’  (Estonian Competition Authority 2009) 
<http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/public/AnnualReports_/Annual_Report_2009.pdf. > 
122 Donald Baker, ‘An Enduring Antitrust Divide Across the Atlantic over Whether to Incarcerate Conspirators and 
When to Restrain Abusive Monopolists’ (2009) 5 European Competition Journal 145, 165. See also Michael 
O’Kane, ‘Does Prison Work for Cartelists? The View from Behind Bars’ (2011) 56 Antitrust Bulliton 483: 
interview of defendant by his counsel in the marine hose litigation. 
123 Spratling and Arp ( n36) 253. 
124 See Julian Joshua, ‘Shooting the Messenger: Does the UK Criminal Cartel Offense Have a Future?’ (Antitrust 
Source August 2010) 1-2 
<http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Aug10_Joshua8_2f.authcheckdam.pdf
>: describing factors leading to the collapse.  Office of Fair Trading, ‘Project Condor Board Review’ (Office of 
Fair Trade 2010) 9-16  <http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_ oft/board/2010/Project_Condor_Board_Review.pdf >: 
setting forth the Office of Fair Traiding’s explanation for the case’s collapse following an internal investigation. 
125 See Joshua stating ‘The collapse on 10 May 2010 of the first contested jury trial under the UK’s lackluster 
criminal cartel regime was not only a humiliating public failure for the OFT, the investigating and prosecuting 
agency; it could also mark the beginning of the end of the whole criminalisation project.’: Julian Joshua, ‘DOA: 
Can the UK Cartel Offence Be Resuscitated?’, in Beaton-Wells and Ezarchi (n 3) 129. 
126  See Competition & Markets Authority, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-markets-
authority. 
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exploitative of customers.127 Countries around the world have been attracted by US and EU 
enforcement models and successful prosecutions. 
Canada has become more active in prosecuting cartel participants, although the 
defendants have generally received a suspended sentence so the law has not had nearly the same 
bite as that of its North American neighbor. Nonetheless, from 1998 to 2008, Canada convicted 
eleven individuals of cartel offenses, nine were required to pay fines (between CDN$10,000 and 
CDN$250,000), and the other two received suspended prison sentences. The 2009 amendment to 
the Canadian Act creates a per se criminal prohibition against price fixing with a maximum 
sentence of fourteen years which could facilitate further criminal prosecutions.128 Indeed, the last 
few years have witnessed a steep increase in conduct challenged by the country’s antitrust 
enforcer.129 After the amendments came into effect in March 2010, for example, companies 
implicated in a polyurethane foam cartel agreed to a fine of CDN$2.5 million, for only five 
months of illegal conduct, under the law’s new conspiracy provision.130 In Australia, survey 
evidence suggests a majority of that country’s public now views antitrust offenses in moral 
terms, following an extensive public-relations campaign by the Australian competition 
authority.131 The survey indicates that 42% of the public believe that cartel conduct should be a 
crime, and as of 2009 it now is.132 In addition to the fines imposed in connection with the 
vitamins cartel, Australian authorities fined six participants in the air transportation cartel in 
2008 and initiated proceedings against participants in the marine hose cartel in June 2009.133 
Australia has since aggressively pursued civil penalties – securing fines in the tens of millions of 
dollars, for example, in connection with a cardboard box and air freight cartel. As of 2015, 
127 See Connor 'Latin America' (n 11) 310. For examples of such portrayal by US antitrust authorities, see Thomas O 
Barnett, ‘Criminal Policy Speeches: Perspectives on Cartel Enforcement in the United States and Brazil’ 
(Department of Justice (US) 28 April 2008) < http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/speech-criminal.html>; 
Hammond (n 5). 
128 Elisa Kearney and Mark Katz, ‘Anti-Cartel Enforcement In Canada - Still More Bark Than Bite’ (Davis 2009) 4–
6. <http://www.dwpv.com/en/Resources/Publications/2009/Article-Anti-Cartel-Enforcement-In-Canada-Still-
More-Bark-Than-Bite> . 
129 Ron Knox, ‘Canada’s Antitrust Bar, Global Competition Review’ (Global Competition Review 6 November 
2012) <http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/features/article/32530/canadas-antitrust-bar/.>. 
130 Competition Bureau, ‘Backgrounder – Polyutherane Foam’ (Competition Bureau Website 6 January 2012) 
<http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/02585.html.>. Additional charges filed under the old 
price-fixing conspiracy provision resulted in a fine of CDN$10 million for fifteen months of illegal conduct: ibid. 
See also ‘Canada Chocolate price-fixing: AP’ Washington Post (Washington 6 June 2013) 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/canada-charges-nestle-mars-with-fixing-chocolate-prices-fines-jail-
time-for-execs-possible/2013/06/06/8bd9a15c-cedf-11e2-8573-3baeea6a2647_story.html.> 
131 See Beaton-Wells noting that a greater percentage of respondents approved of punishment for moral reasons than 
for reasons of economic harm: Beaton-Wells (n 4) 17; See generally Melbourne Law School, ‘Cartel Project’ 
(Melbourne Law School Website 2014) <http://cartel.law.unimelb.edu.au/go/project-news/project-survey.>; 
Compare Andreas Stephen, ‘How Dishonesty Killed the Cartel Offence’ (2011)6 Criminal Law Review 446; 
Andreas Stephen, ‘Survey of Public Attitudes to Price-Fixing and Cartel Enforcement in Britain’ (2008) 5 
Competition Law Review 123: analyzing effects of British public’s failure to perceive cartels as morally 
blameworthy. 
132 Beaton-Wells (n 4) 25. 
133 Chavez (n 16) 942. 
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however, the government has not yet initiated a criminal prosecution for cartel conduct under the 
new law.134  
Overall, Asian cartel enforcement has sharply increased, with approximately triple the 
number of investigations initiated in the 2005–2008 period compared to 1995–2004.135 In 2002, 
South Korea fined participants in the graphite electrode cartel—the Korea Fair Trade 
Commission’s first assessment of fines against an international cartel since its creation in 
1981.136 Korea also imposed small fines on three of the sixteen vitamins cartels in 2003.137 
Korea’s leniency program is increasingly important; in 2010, the program played a role in 17 of 
25 investigations leading to fines.138 In 2007 Japan imposed prison sentences (ranging between 
eighteen months and three years) on five executives for bid rigging. The prosecution followed 
and was the first based upon a leniency application as part of Japan’s new leniency program.139 
Despite this enforcement activity, Asia is still a weak link in international enforcement given the 
size of Asian economies and the profit potential for cartels.140  
Since 2003, Latin American competition authorities have been increasingly active in anti-
cartel activities, and ‘[b]y nearly all measures, Brazil has the largest and most effective anti-
cartel authority in Latin America.’141 Brazil adopted a ‘National Anti-cartel Strategy’ (ENACC) 
in October 2009, as part of its second national Anti-Cartel Enforcement Day, in an effort to 
shape social perceptions of cartel activity and public awareness of government anti-cartel 
policies.142 The ENACC has since ‘evolved into a network of government and criminal 
enforcers, headed by a council created to coordinate administrative investigations and criminal 
prosecution.’143 Brazil’s criminal enforcement efforts have been robust. Brazil fines more hard-
core cartels annually and imposes higher average corporate cartel fines than any other country in 
the region; it is also alone in Latin America in regularly fining cartel managers.144 Brazil fined 
participants of the vitamins cartel, and its Secretariat of Economic Law within the Justice 
Ministry has prosecuted participants in the air cargo and marine hose cartels.145 Moreover, 
Brazilian antitrust authorities have succeeded in reaching a number of settlement agreements – in 
134 Sharon Henrick & Trish Henry, ‘Australia: Cartels’, (The Asia-Pacific Antitrust Review 2012): noting fines of 
A$36 million and more than A$52 million in connection with cardboard box cartel and air freight industry, 
respectively.  
135 Connor 'Cartels & Antitrust Portrayed' (n 72) 23. To be more precise, the term “investigations” here encompasses 
all government and private legal actions, including formal investigations, fines, damage suits, and consent decrees: 
ibid 16. 
136 Hwan Jeong, ‘Expansion in the Extraterritoriality of Korean Law’  (Asia Law September 2009) 
<http://www.asialaw.com/Article/2330631/Competition-abroad.html?Print=true&Single=true>; Chavez (n 16) 
943. 
137 Connor, ‘Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions’ (n 67) 201; Jeong (n 138). 
138 Kim Da-ye, ‘Two Faces of Secret-for-Pardon Policy’, Korea Times (Seoul 29 July 29 2012), <2012 WLNR 
15952389>: discussing differences between US and Korean leniency programs. 
139 Spratling and Arp ( n36) 242, 252. 
140 Connor, ‘Focus on Asia’ (n 89) 593. 
141 Connor 'Latin America' (n 11) 315. 
142 OECD (n 52) 19. The Enforcement Day program included senior enforcement officials from the US and EU: 
ibid. 
143 Bruno Peixoto, ‘Brazil: Cartels and Leniency - The Antitrust Review of the Americas’ (Global Competition 
Review  2013) <http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/46/sections/158/chapters/1809/brazil-cartels-
leniency/.> 
144 Connor 'Latin America' (n 11) 316. 
145 Chavez (n 16) 942–43.  
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connection with, for example, the marine hose, driving schools, and cement and beef cartels – 
pursuant to Brazil’s settlement program adopted in 2007.146 As of mid-2012 more than 250 
executives faced criminal penalties for cartel behavior, and the government had sentenced thirty-
four to jail time ranging from two to five years.147  
Elsewhere in Latin America, Mexico—which has one of the largest and best-funded 
antitrust authorities in Latin America148—fined participants in the citric acid cartel. Although 
Mexico’s competition authority has been preoccupied with mergers and monopoly cases, and has 
done little to attack cartels,149 this situation could change following passage of a new antitrust 
law in 2011 which includes criminal sanctions and more substantial investigatory tools. Focusing 
mostly on merger control and abuse of dominance, Argentina’s and Chile’s cartel enforcement 
programs are relatively underdeveloped. Argentina generally prosecutes only one or two hard-
core cartels per year and imposes negligible fines.150  
In the Middle East, Israel has been active in prosecuting cartel offenses, possibly 
reflecting closer normative ties to US antitrust policy. Israel secured jail sentences of between 
three and nine months for four executives and one economic advisor in its prosecution of a price-
fixing and market division cartel involving the floor tile industry.151 Israel’s prosecution of cartel 
offenses in the liquefied petroleum gas market led to a plea agreement involving jail sentences 
and fines for three defendants, including a prison term for the CEO of one of Israel’s largest gas 
distribution companies.152 In more recent cases, Israeli authorities have even arrested executives 
implicated in cartel activity at the start of the investigation to prevent the executives from 
interfering.153 Egypt’s first criminal cartel prosecution since the creation of its Department to 
Protect Competition and Prohibit Monopoly came in early 2008 against twenty cement company 
executives. By summer’s end, an Egyptian court convicted the executives, fining them the 
equivalent of $1.9 million dollars each for price fixing and agreeing to divide the market.154 
 
4. International cooperation efforts 
 
Transnational initiatives have spurred the diffusion of legal norms regarding cartels and 
enforcement techniques to uncover and deter them. Throughout the post-World War II era, the 
US has played a central role in global business regulation.155 And so it has since the early 1990s 
in the global trend toward strengthening enforcement tools against cartel offenses, including the 
addition of criminal sanctions. The global trend coincided with the US DOJ’s aggressive stance 
toward international cartels dating from the early 1990s.156 The US efforts were supported by a 
146 OECD (n 52) 11, 17. 
147 Peixoto (n 145). See also OECD (n 52) 18. 
148 Connor 'Latin America' (n 11) 317. 
149 ibid 318. 
150 ibid 316–17. 
151 Spratling and Arp ( n36) 252. 
152 ibid 
153 Katy Oglethorpe, ‘Freshfields Panel Examines Global Cartel Enforcement Issues’ (Global Competition Review 4 
October 2012) <http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/32415/freshfields-panel-examines-global-
cartel-enforcement-issues/.>. 
154 Spratling and Arp ( n36) 252–53.  
155 See John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press 2000); Daniel 
W Drezner, All Politics is Global (Princeton University Press 2007) 5–6; Shaffer (n 2). 
156 Harding (n 3) 194. 
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general ideological shift in government attitudes toward market competition following the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989. The US has worked through a number of fora to foster the diffusion of 
anti-cartel norms, national institution building to address cartels, and transgovernmental 
cooperation efforts. It has worked particularly through the OECD, the ICN, bilateral treaties, 
memoranda of understanding, and informal relations.157 The EU and EU member states have 




The OECD has addressed competition issues going back to its Competition Law and 
Policy Committee in 1961.158 Much of its efforts related to urging its members to cooperate in 
competition matters.159 Its efforts significantly intensified against cartels in 1998 when the 
OECD issued its ‘Council Recommendation Concerning Effective Action against Hard Core 
Cartels’, constituting the first multilateral statement defining and condemning hard core cartels 
as pernicious. The OECD condemned ‘hard core cartels’ ‘as the most egregious violations of 
competition law.’160 The second report on the Recommendation’s implementation concluded in 
similar terms that ‘cartels are unambiguously bad,’ and the third report cited with approval a 
2004 US Supreme Court opinion that cartels are the ‘supreme evil of antitrust.’161  
Under its anti-cartel program, the OECD sponsors meetings of national authorities, 
publishes policy briefs and booklets designed to encourage particular enforcement tools such as 
the use of leniency programs (discussed in Part 5.2), collects information on sanctions, and 
compiles lists of best practices.162 In parallel, the OECD (complemented by a parallel program in 
UNCTAD) issues peer review reports on individual countries’ efforts to detect, investigate, and 
prosecute domestic and international cartels.163 It does so with the assistance of the countries’ 
national authorities who become key intermediaries for the conveyance of global anti-cartel 
norms and practices. The peer review process presses them to cast a critical eye on their own 
policies, and can provide leverage for them in domestic contests over policy reform. To expand 
its reach, the OECD established a broader Global Forum on Competition in 2001, and 
established regional competition centers in Eastern Europe and Asia while sponsoring a Latin 
American Competition Forum.164 
The OECD’s 2005 report on the implementation of its 1998 Recommendation noted 
‘aggressive enforcement efforts at very high levels, finding [that] competition authorities in more 
157 Spencer Weber Waller, ‘The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement’ (1997) 77 Boston Univeristy Law 
Review 343. 
158 Hugh Hollman & William E. Kovacic, ‘The International Competition Network: Its Past, Current and Future 
Potential (2011) 20 Minnesota Journal of Internaitonal Law 274. 
159 See for example ‘Recommendation of the Council concerning Co-operation between Member Countries on 
Anticompetitive Practices affecting International Trade (9C(95)130/FINAL)’ ( OECD Website 27 July 1995) 
<http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=192&InstrumentPID=188&Lang=en
&Book=False> 
160 OECD, ‘Hard Core Cartels: Third report on the implementation of the 1998 Council Recommendation 7’ (OECD 
2005). 
161 ibid 7, 8 (italics in original). 
162 See Chavez (n 16) 963–64. 
163 Hollman and Kovacic (n 160). UNCTAD also engages in peer review exercises, and complements some of the 
OECD’s work within its own organizational focus dedicated to serving developing countries.  
164 Hollman and Kovacic (n 160) 
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countries than ever bring important cases that resulted in significant sanctions.’165 The report 
concluded that ‘more countries are catching up and improving their enforcement regimes in line 
with developments in the most advanced jurisdictions,’ and that ‘[c]ooperation among authorities 
in investigations of cartels has reached unprecedented levels.’166 The report detailed illustrative 
examples of cartel investigations, discussed efforts to raise public awareness of cartel-related 
harm, reviewed international efforts to cooperate in investigations and enforcement actions, and 
detailed best practices for formal information sharing.167 It stressed, for example, that ‘[m]aking 
the public aware of the harm caused by cartels is an important part of a country’s overall effort to 
combat cartels,’ including through a ‘strong media relations programme,’ and it pointed to ‘[t]he 
programmes developed in Canada and the US’ as ‘good examples of what competition 
authorities can do to educate the public.’168 The report noted the particular importance of 
‘sanctions against natural persons, placing them at risk individually for their conduct,’ and 




The ICN was created in 2001 under US-instigation following an announcement of 
fourteen competition agencies.170 It is a network of competition law officials and non-
governmental advisors who have so far come predominately from the private sector.171 As of 
May 2015, the ICN is comprised of 132 national, regional, and other territorial antitrust agencies 
operating in 119 jurisdictions, and the list continues to grow.172 It is now the central node for the 
diffusion and building of consensus around competition law norms and practices, facilitating the 
coordination of transnational regulatory efforts.173 In 2004, the ICN created a Cartel Working 
Group. The Working Group’s mandate ‘is to address the challenges of anti-cartel enforcement 
across the entire range of ICN members and amongst agencies with differing levels of 
experience. At the heart of antitrust enforcement is the battle against hardcore cartels directed at 
price fixing, bid rigging, market sharing and market allocations.’ 174 The Working Group 
contains sub-groups on legal frameworks and enforcement techniques and has produced (among 
other projects) an anti-cartel enforcement manual for its members’ use. Though the OECD did 
much of the early work on ‘hard core cartels,’ and continues to be important for policy analysis, 
165 OECD 'Hard Core Cartels' (n 163) 8. 
166 ibid 8, 30. 
167 ibid 12–35. 
168 ibid  8, 16, 18–19. 
169 ibid , 28 (italics in original). 
170 Eleanor Fox, ‘Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network’ (2009) 143 International Law 151, 160 . 
For a recent retrospective of the network, see Paul Lugard (ed), The International Competition Network at Ten: 
Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations (Intersentia  2011). 
171 Hollman and Kovacic (n 160). 
172 See ICN, The International Competitions Network to Focus on its Membership Needs, May 1, 2015, available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc1027.pdf (last checked, June 5, 2015). For an 
earlier figure from 2010, see John Fingleton, ‘The International Competition Network: Planning for the Second 
Decade’ ( ICN 9th Annual Conference, Istanbul, Turkey 27  Apr 2010) 2–3: giving a figure of 112 agencies from 99 
jurisdictions in 2010. 
173 Hollman and Kovacic (n 160). 
174 ICN ‘Working Groups’, (International Competition Network Website  2014)  
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/working-groups/current/cartel.aspx.> 
  
                                                 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2288871
 23 
the ICN has served to diffuse ideas and build relationships among OECD and non-OECD 
regulators and practitioners.  
The ICN’s aim is to foster ‘procedural and substantive convergence’ of competition law 
policy through sustained interaction, capacity building, and the sharing of practices.175 It 
facilitates deliberation among national competition authorities regarding preferred approaches to 
use against cartels, as well as to sort out differences.176 The ICN produces practical guidance, 
such as the Manual on Anti-Cartel Enforcement Techniques, and organizes workshops and 
teleseminars, including an annual ICN Cartel Workshop. The Manual on Anti-Cartel 
Enforcement Techniques, for example, contains chapters on searches, raids and inspections; 
drafting and implementation of effective leniency programs; digital evidence gathering; cartel 
case initiation; investigative strategy; and interviewing techniques. In 2005, the Cartel Working 
Group published the paper ‘Defining Hard Core Cartel Conduct, Effective Institutions, Effective 
Penalties’. The paper stresses ‘the significance of the personal liability of the decision-makers,’ 
and notes that ‘[s]ome agencies also emphasize the effectiveness of criminal sanctions as a 
deterrent.’177 
The ICN arguably has been successful in contributing to change in legislation and 
administrative practice across jurisdictions regarding cartels. ICN member agencies cite the 
ICN’s Cartel Enforcement Manual as a crucial tool in developing national cartel enforcement 
strategies.178 US Deputy Assistant Attorney General Scott Hammond points to the Cartel 
Working Group’s annual workshops as particularly useful, providing a venue for anti-cartel 
enforcers to meet, learn from one another, and develop working relationships that form the basis 
for future cooperation.179 These informal connections, he writes, have led to ‘pick up the phone’ 
cooperation between competition regulators in different jurisdictions over time.180 The European 
Commission estimates that the ICN conducts 90% of its work by teleconference or email.181 
Antitrust officials from national agencies around the world have increasingly shared resources 
and coordinated investigations, creating a sense of a shared professional enterprise. Coordinated 
activity has expanded greatly, including over the timing of raids and the execution of warrants.182  
The ICN complements bilateral cooperation among competition agencies and 
governments through anti-trust cooperation agreements and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 
(MLATs), which can be used against cartels. The US currently has either a cooperation 
agreement or MLAT with Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, the EU, Germany, 
India, Italy, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Russia, and the United Kingdom.183 National agencies, for 
175 ‘Memorandum on the Establishment and Operation of the International Competition Network’ (International 
Competition Network Website  2014)  
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc579.pdf.> 
176 Fingleton (n 174) 5–6. 
177 ICN ‘Network Cartels Working Group, Defining Hard Core Cartel Conduct, Effective Institutions, Effective 
Penalties’ (International Competition Network  2005)  3–4 
<http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc346.pdf.> 
178 ICN ‘Trends’ (n 68). 
179 Hammond (n 5)14–15.  
180 ibid 15: discussing collaboration between US and UK regulators. 
181 Chad Damro, ‘The New Trade Politics and EU Competition Policy: Shopping for Convergence and Co-
operation’ (2006) 13 Journal of European Public Policy 867, 879. 
182 Hammond (n 5) 15. See also Spratling and Arp ( n36) 255–61. 
183  Department of Justice (US) ‘Antitrust Cooperation Agreements’ (Department of Justice (US) Website 2014) 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/international/int-arrangements.html. 
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example, cooperated successfully to secure plea agreements in connection with the airlines 
cartel, and coordinated investigative efforts in connection with the marine hose cartel.184 These 
agreements reflect the growing role of international coordination in cartel investigations. 
Transnational legal norms are more likely to have impacts where they are clear, coherent, 
and deemed legitimate.185 The ICN and OECD provide fora in which networks of national 
competition law officials participate. These international initiatives have expanded their access 
for officials from jurisdictions around the world. Although the OECD and ICN can be viewed as 
rivals, the norms that they have conveyed are coherent, and the documents that codify them are 
precise and elaborate.  
The officials who participate in the ICN and OECD initiatives act as intermediaries 
between the national context and the global one.186 Where they develop professional identities as 
competition law enforcers, and where they meaningfully participate in these transnational 
processes, they more likely view the documents that emerge from them to represent a legitimate 
expression of a transnational policy consensus. In such situations, they are more likely to actively 
press for concomitant domestic legal change and engage in enforcement efforts. It is through this 
web of global, regional and bilateral networks that anti-cartel enforcement ideas diffuse.  
The OECD and ICN are just the most important among transgovernmental and 
transnational networks of legal norm diffusion. The broader network of international competition 
law and international competition law enforcers includes the UNCTAD that plays an important 
role for developing nations, as well as a wide variety of non-governmental and academic 
institutions, programs, and events. Non-governmental advisors representing business and 
consumer groups, academia, and the legal and economic professions are significantly involved in 
these processes, so that the processes are not simply ‘transgovernmental,’ but more broadly 
transnational. Diffused common norms through both public and private actors facilitate 
transgovernmental coordination, and the practical experience of successful coordination in a 
common enterprise, in turn, spurs further normative convergence across and within nation states. 
 
5. Trends in Enforcement Techniques 
   
Multilateral and bilateral cooperative efforts, such as through the ICN, OECD, and 
bilateral agreements, have circulated new enforcement tools to combat cartels. We address two, 
the facilitation of extradition through the criminalization of cartel activities; and the use of 
leniency programs to induce the breakup of cartels.  
 
5.1 Extradition and the Case of Ian Norris  
Extradition requires dual criminality.187 This means that the offense at issue must be a 
crime in both jurisdictions. One consequence of the criminalization of cartel offenses is that 
more countries may extradite individuals for prosecution in other jurisdictions. The jurisdiction 
most likely seeking such extradition and most likely to imprison individuals is the US. If 
184 Hammond (n 5) 15–16. 
185 Shaffer (n 2). 
186 On intermediaries, see Bruce Carruthers and Terence C Halliday, ‘Negotiating Globalization: Global Scripts and 
Intermediation in the Construction of Asian Insolvency Regimes’ (2006) 31 Law & Social Inquiry 521, 537; 
Shaffer (n 2). 
187 Dual criminality, a requirement of most US extradition treaties, requires that the offense at issue must be a crime 
in both jurisdictions. See generally Girardet (n 43). 
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extradition to the US becomes easier, decisions for participants in cartels about international 
business travel become more complex.  
In March 2010, Ian Norris became the first foreign national extradited to the US to face 
charges stemming from an antitrust investigation.188 Norris obstructed the DOJ’s investigation 
into a carbon components manufacturing cartel in which he participated. In November 2002, UK 
industrial manufacturer Morgan Crucible and its US subsidiary Morganite admitted to 
wrongdoing in connection with a price-fixing conspiracy. Norris headed Morgan Crucible during 
a part of the conspiracy and throughout the cover-up. The US indicted him on both counts, and 
alleged that his offenses were flagrant. He was found to have assembled a document-destruction 
task force whose sole purpose was to destroy evidence of the price-fixing conspiracy. That task 
force created a script, designed to mislead investigators, for use by Morgan-entity executives 
questioned about the conspiracy. After the DOJ investigation became public, Norris instructed 
his co-conspirators to use the script if questioned about the illicit meetings. 
The DOJ’s attempt to extradite Norris to the US initially failed. The House of Lords held 
in 2008 that price-fixing was not a crime at the time in question (as it is now in the UK), and thus 
the dual criminality requirement of the US-UK extradition treaty was not satisfied. The House of 
Lords nonetheless remanded the case on the question of whether extradition for obstruction of 
justice was proper. The lower courts rejected Norris’s argument that extradition would violate 
the European Convention on Human Rights in view of his (and his wife’s) age and poor health—
a result unanimously affirmed on appeal by the UK Supreme Court (which in 2009 assumed the 
role of court of final resort from the House of Lords). The European Court of Human Rights 
rejected his appeal on human rights grounds in February of 2010. On March 23, 2010, the UK 
extradited Norris to the US to stand trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.189 A federal jury 
convicted him of conspiring to obstruct justice on July 27, 2010,190 and in December 2010 a 
judge sentenced him to eighteen months in a US prison.191 
The Norris extradition has not proved to be a one-off event. In 2014, a former marine hose 
executive was extradited from Germany to face charges of participating in a worldwide bid-
rigging conspiracy making this the first extradition for a direct antitrust crime, rather than the 
obstruction of justice charges in the Norris case. Extraditions will likely become more 
commonplace as a growing number of countries criminalize cartel activity. As a result, avoiding 
travel to the US may no longer be sufficient to insulate cartel members from the prospect of 
spending time in a US prison. Even short of extradition, growing criminalization means 
substantial travel restrictions and the use of border controls and Interpol to monitor the location 
of defendants and fugitives.192 
188 A good overview from which this summary is built can be found at Akin Gump Update, ‘The Antitrust Division 
Succeeds in Its First-Ever Extradition of a Foreign National’  (Akin Gump  26 March 2010) 
<http://www.akingump.com/communicationcenter/newsalertdetail.aspx?pub=2442>; see also, for example Julian 
M Joshua, Peter D Camesasca, Youngjin Jung, ‘Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties: Cartel 
Enforcement's Global Reach’ (2008) 75 Antitrust Law Journal 353, 354-60. 
189 ibid. 
190 ‘DOJ News Release on Ian Norris Conviction’ ( Main justice  27 July  2010), 
<http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/07/27/doj-news-release-on-ian-norris-conviction/.> 
191 ‘Former Morgan Crucible Chief Ian Norris Sentenced to 18 Months in US Jail’, The Telegraph (London 10 
Decembr 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/engineering/8195756/Former-
Morgan-Crucible-chief-Ian-Norris-sentenced-to-18-months-in-US-jail.html.>. 
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5.2 Leniency Programs 
 
  Antitrust officials point to the proliferation, convergence and coordination of leniency 
provisions to destabilize cartels as another major development in anti-cartel enforcement around 
the world. Leniency programs generally provide immunity to the first cartelist to admit liability 
and cooperate with authorities, with the aim of creating a ‘race to confess.’ 193 They are used as a 
carrot to complement the stick of enhanced sanctions, such as criminalization or substantial 
fines. In some ways, they can be viewed as ‘a motor of penal expansion,’ as leniency becomes 
more attractive when the alternative of sanctions becomes more threatening.194 The program was 
first developed in the US and has been zealously used there. Gary Spratling, former US Deputy 
Assistant Attorney General for cartel prosecution, reports that the use of leniency is linked to 
90% of US cartel fines imposed since 1997.195  
The US has aggressively sought to promote leniency programs, and the ICN has 
publicized procedures to aid national competition agencies in implementing them. In 1990, only 
the US had a leniency program on the books. Today around 60 jurisdictions do,196 including 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, the EU, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, South 
Korea, New Zealand, Sweden, and the UK.197 The DOJ’s Hammond thus describes this 
phenomenon as ‘the single most significant development in cartel enforcement.’198 The diffusion 
of leniency programs as an anti-cartel enforcement tool again attests to the normative power of 
the US model diffused through the ICN.  
Nonetheless, some might question whether the parallel trend toward global 
criminalization should enhance or hamper the effectiveness of leniency programs.199 While 
Hammond rightly stresses that the threat of harsh sanctions in a jurisdiction should induce cartel 
members to seek immunity, the cartel participant must also be wary of potential sanctions in 
other jurisdictions where the cartel’s activities have transnational effects. Where the potential 
sanction in another jurisdiction is penal, the participant’s decision may become more 
complicated, especially in light of institutional divergences for enforcing criminal sanctions and 
administering amnesty and leniency programs in different jurisdictions so that decisions may lie 
outside the control of a national antitrust authority.200 
 
6. Impediments to Implementation: Social Norms and Institutional Structures   
 
Notwithstanding the expansion of criminal provisions and the increasingly robust 
enforcement of cartel prohibitions around the world, actual enforcement will face severe 
193 ICN Cartel Working Group, ‘Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual’ (ICN 2009) 2. 
194 Harding and Joshua (n 7) 297. 
195 Spratling and Arp ( n36) 287. 
196 Telephone Interview with US DOJ official ( 10 June 2011); see also Hammond (n 5) 2–3. 
197 Hammond (n 5) 2–3; see also Chavez (n 16) 968–78: listing jurisdictions and discussing the programs 
extensively. 
198 Hammond (n 5) 2–3. 
199 See Jason D Medinger, ‘Antitrust Leniency Programs: A Call for Increased Harmonization as Proliferating 
Programs Undermine Deterrence’ (2003) 52 Emory Law Journal 1439. 52 Emory L.J. 1439, 1441 (2003). 
200 Jonathan T Schmidt, ‘Keeping US Courts Open to Foreign Antitrust Plaintiffs: A Hybrid Approach to the 
Effective Deterrence of International Cartels’ (2006) 31 Yale Journal of  Internatonal Law 211, 232-40, 245-50. 
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practical limits in most jurisdictions. The implementation of transnational legal norms will 
ultimately depend on local factors, and in particular, domestic political and social attitudes 
regarding cartel behavior, and domestic institutional structures, capacities and legacies.201  
Cultural attitudes may be the single biggest hurdle to enforcement trends. Not all 
members of the public are convinced that cartel offenses merit the criminal penalty of jail time, 
which is advocated most vocally by the US. Criminalization implicates moral judgments that 
vary with socio-cultural context. US antitrust law has long exhibited a moral dimension, which 
facilitates the use of criminal sanctions against individuals in cartel cases.202 In contrast, ‘there 
appears to be (at least outside North America) no strong feeling on the part of the wider public 
about the inherent criminality of price fixing and like practices.’203 National competition 
authorities outside of North America recognize this uphill battle and thus view public education 
about the evils of cartel offenses as a central component of their missions.204 Presentations in 
October 2010 by competition authorities from Australia and Japan at the ICN’s Cartel Workshop 
in Yokohama, Japan reflect this concern.205 The 2010 ICN survey extensively reports ‘factors 
influencing perception of importance of cartel enforcement.’206 To the extent that public opinion 
supporting criminalization is lacking in many jurisdictions, the transnational trend can be 
understood as more of a top-down than a bottom-up process. As a result, the impact at the time 
of implementation could be limited. 
 Another significant hurdle is institutional, involving particular institutional heritages, 
structures, and capacity challenges. Jurisdictions in Europe and Asia that have an institutional 
heritage of using administrative agencies that apply administrative fines against enterprises, as 
opposed to criminal sanctions against individuals, are unlikely to change significantly, at least in 
the short term. In addition, for most jurisdictions, criminal law enforcement involves a separate 
institution from cartel enforcement, creating institutional coordination challenges. A competition 
agency may wish to retain its monopoly on enforcement, and public prosecutors may not trust 
competition authorities. In contrast, the US entrusts both civil and criminal enforcement against 
cartels to a specialized division within the DOJ, which has created a particular institutional 
legacy that facilitates the use of criminal sanctions. Also, many competition systems are in their 
infancy and lack institutional capacity. Competition law is particularly recent in China and 
Egypt, for example, and it has recently undergone a major overhaul in states such as Brazil, 
India, and Mexico. Finally, there are jurisdiction-specific disincentives, such as constitutional 
and evidentiary hurdles, which complicate the pursuit of aggressive enforcement.207 In sum, both 
institutional legacies and political and social attitudes toward cartels will affect the application of 
anti-cartel law in practice, especially as regards criminalization. In many cases, we are skeptical 
that enforcement practice will meaningfully follow the spread of formal legal policies. 
201 Shaffer (n 2). 
202 Baker (n 124) 155, 158. 
203 Harding (n 3) 197. See also Gerber  noting the lack of cultural roots of competition policy in Japan: Gerber (n 7) 
213, 217. 
204 See Beaton-Wells noting the Australian competition authority’s extensive campaign in this respect: Beatton-
Wells (n 4). 
205 See ibid; Hideo Nakajima, Director General Investigation Bureau, Japan Fair Trade Commission, ‘Outreach 
Activities by the JFTC: Focusing on Cartel Awareness’ (5 October 2010) 9: discussing the ‘necessity of building 
up public support for cartel enforcement’.  
206 See ICN 'Trends' (n 68)53–65. 
207 Harding (n 3) 193–94. 
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7. Conclusion  
 
Countries in every region of the world, including virtually all of the world’s leading 
economies, have significantly enhanced sanctions and, in a growing number of cases, 
criminalized cartel offenses, often only recently. Many states have initiated prosecutions, several 
have secured convictions, and a few have imposed jail time for these offenses. The US DOJ has 
played a central role as a unilateral enforcer against international cartels, as a collaborator with 
other national competition agencies in enforcement, and as an anti-cartel advocate in 
international fora. International venues such as the ICN now play an important role in offering 
guidance to national competition agencies, and in providing a forum for policy deliberation, 
information sharing, cooperation, and professional socialization. Harry First, former Chief of 
New York state’s Antitrust Bureau, goes so far as to declare that we already ‘have international 
‘law’ [against cartels] without ever having adopted one at the international level.’208 
Since criminal law lies at the heart of state sovereignty, the global trend toward 
criminalization of cartel offenses is quite remarkable. Yet the criminalization and enforcement 
records outside the US are hardly uniform. Given the novelty of legal changes in so many 
countries, and the challenges of institutional capacity for many, we are skeptical regarding actual 
enforcement in many countries that have formally adopted enhanced sanctions. Even in states 
that have criminalized cartel offenses, lingering questions remain about the propriety of 
criminalization and imprisonment. Much of the criminalization trend thus appears to be a product 
of transnational enforcement interests more than of domestic bottom-up processes. While 
countries appear to be moving toward convergence on enhanced sanctions, including criminal 
penalties against individuals, national competition agencies outside of North America are—to 
borrow from Harold Koh—grappling with the task of bringing home transnational legal norms 





208 First (n 104) 727. 
209 Koh (n 9). 
  
                                                 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2288871
 29 
TABLE 1: Criminalization of Cartel Conduct by Country, 
Listed Chronologically 
 
i All years are based upon the date the law was enacted 
ii A country is deemed to meet this standard if it has prosecuted individuals under their criminal law, or, in the event 
that it has only recently criminalized cartel conduct, it has stressed that it is its intention to do so. This category 
involves, in part, a subjective judgment. 
iii All criminal fines are based upon penalties in the current law 
iv All terms of imprisonment are based upon penalties in the current law 











Canada1 1889  Yes (became 
more active 
in late 1990s) 
Max. CDN$25 million Max. 14 
years 




1890 (became a 




Corporation Max. US$100 
million or twice the gain 
from the illegal conduct or 
twice the loss to the victims; 









Min. € 103,00 






Poland4 1932* No Administrative fines only Max. 3 
years 
1990 (new law in 
2007) 
Japan5 1947 (amended in 






Max. 5 million yen  Max. 5 
years 
1947 
France6 1953 (became 
primarily civil in 
1986) 
No Max. €75,000 Max. 4 
years  
1945 (new laws in 
1986 and 2001) 
Austria7 1959* (originally 
criminalized all hard 
core cartels, in 2002 
decriminalized 
except for bid 
rigging) 
No Administrative fines only Max. 3 
years 
1951 (new laws in 
1984 and 2005) 
Norway8 1960  Yes (became 
more active 
in the 1980s) 




1926 (new laws in 
1993 and 2004) 
Israel9 1961 Yes (became 
more active 
in late 1990s) 
Corporation Max. NIS 4 
million plus NIS 28,000 for 
each day offence persists; 
Max. 5 
years  
1959 (new law in 
1988) 
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Individual Max. NIS 2 
million plus NIS 14,000 for 
each day such offence 
persists. 
Spain10 1973 (revision in 
1995 separating 
general cartels and 
bid rigging) 
No Min. fine of 1 year 
(percentage of income 
determined by judge) 






1963 (new laws in 
1989 and 2007) 
Greece11 1977 (initially 
provided for 
imprisonment but 
later abolished and 
reinstated in 2009) 
Yes Min. €100,000  
Max. €1,000,000  
Min. 2 
years  




1980 Yes (became 
more active 
in 2008) 
Max. KRW 200 million Max. 3 
years 
1980 
Kenya13 1988 No Max. KES 10 million Max. 5 
years 
1988 (new law in 
2010) 
Brazil14 1990 Yes (became 
more active 
post-2003) 
Min. 1/30 minimum wage 






1962 (new laws in 
1990, 1991, and 
1994) 
Taiwan15 1991 (amended in 





Max. TWD 100 million (but 







Iceland16 1993 Yes (became 
more active 
in late 2000s) 




1993 (new law in 
2005) 
Slovakia17 1993 No Administrative fines only Max. 6 
years 
1991 (new laws in 
1994 and 2001) 
Zambia18 1994 No Max. 500,000 penalty units 




1994 (new law in 
2010) 
Slovenia19 1995 (major revision 
was made to 
criminal law in 2008 
but no prosecution 
to date) 
No  Corporation Min. €50,000 
Max. 200 times damage 
caused or illegal gain 
obtained 
Individual Min. 30 days of 
salary 





1993 (new law in 
2008) 





1953 (new laws in 
1991 and 2002) 






Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2288871
 31 
 
* These countries have limited criminalization of cartel activity to bid rigging in public tenders. 
This Table provides an entry point for understanding the state of criminalization in countries. 
While we note those countries that criminalize only bid rigging, the Table does not break down 
countries in terms of whether the criminal offense focuses specifically on cartels or more broadly 
on competition law violations. The Table also does not note countries that have completely 
Russia22 1996 Yes (became 
more active 
in 2010) 
Max. RUR 1 million or 5 
years of salary 
Max. 7 
years  
1991 (new law in 
2006) 
Denmark23 1997** No Amount of criminal fines not 
specified  
None 1937 (new laws in 
1990 and 1997) 
Germany24 1997* Yes None Max. 5 
years 
1923 (new law in 
1958) 
Indonesia25 1999 No 
  
Min. Rp. 25 billion 




Thailand26 1999 No Max. THB 6 million  Max. 3 
years 
1979 (new law in 
1999) 
Barbados27 2002 No  Corporation Max. BBD 
500,000; Individual Max. 
BBD 150,000 (only 
imposed if fail to end 








Estonia28 2002 Yes Corporation:  
Max. €16 million or 10% of 
revenue; Individual Min. 30 
days of salary  
Max. 500 days of salary 
Max. 3 
years  
1993 (new laws in 
1998 and 2001) 
United 
Kingdom29 
2002 Yes Unlimited fines Max. 5 
years 
1948 (new laws in 
1998 and 2002) 
Hungary30 2005* No Administrative only Max. 5 
years 
1990 (new law in 
1996) 
Australia31 2009 Yes Corporation Max. AUS$ 10 
million or 3 times the gain 
from the illegal conduct or, 
if that gain cannot be 





1906 (new laws in 




2009 Yes Amount of criminal fines 









2009*** Yes Max. R 500,000  Max. 10 
years 
1955 (new laws in 
1979 and 1998) 
Mexico34 2011 Yes Min. 1,000 days of salary 





1924 (new laws in 
1992 and 2011) 
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decriminalized cartel violations, such as Finland, although the footnotes provide information as 
to countries which have decriminalized cartels except for bid rigging, such as Germany. The 
Table also does not note those jurisdictions where fines are formally administrative (and not 
criminal), but where their stringency can arguably be viewed as punitive and thus penal in 
practice, such as the European Union, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands.  
** The countries only impose criminal fines and do not imprison violators. 
*** South Africa passed legislation to criminalize cartel activity in 2009 but it has not yet gone 
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1 Canada was the first country to criminalize cartels. See: Julian M Joshua and others, ‘Extradition and Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties: Cartel Enforcement's Global Reach’ (2008) 75 Antitrust law Journal 353, 378. Canada has 
frequently amended its Competition Act throughout the years. The first jail sentence did not take place until 1996. 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/00960.html. In 2009 the Act was amended by creating 
a per se criminal prohibition against agreements between competitors to fix prices. 
http://www.dwpv.com/images/Anti-Cartel_Enforcement_in_Canada_-_Still_More_Bark_Than_Bite.pdf. 
For the current Act see: http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/h_00148.html. 
2 The United States criminalizes cartels both under the Sherman Act, and under state statues. See: 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4131.pdf.  Violations of the Act were originally only a 
misdemeanor, but in 1974 Congress made violations a felony. See: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/doi/10.1111/j.1465-7287.1989.tb00574.x/abstract. The US DOJ 
first became increasingly more active in using criminal law in the 1990s. For the modern Act see: 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode15/usc_sec_15_00000001----000-.html. 
3 Article 353 of the Italian Criminal Code, adopted on October 19, 1930, criminalizes any colluding activity which 
may affect the result of public tender procedures. Bid rigging crimes, particularly in the construction industry, 
have been vigorously prosecuted since the Clean Hands political corruption scandal in the early 1990s. Email from 
Giulio Cesare Rizza of Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP law firm to author ( 21 June 2011). See also: 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4111.pdf; and ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, 
Competition Laws Outside the United States, 2D 2011. 
4 For the Polish Act on Competition and Consumers, see: http://www.uokik.gov.pl/download.php?plik=7618. 
Article 305 of the Polish Criminal Code criminalizes bid rigging in public tenders. See: 
http://km.undp.sk/uploads/public/File/AC_Practitioners_Network/Poland_Penal_Code.pdf (1997 version in 
English). For the current version of the Penal Code in Polish see: 
http://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/10. See also: 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/index.php?area=4&country_results=1&kh_publications_id=171&chapters_id=4119; and 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/29/34720956.pdf. Bid rigging was first criminalized in the 1932 Criminal Code 
in Article 283. Email from Ewa Gojniczek of WKB Wiercinski, Kwiecinski, Baehr law firm, July 25, 2011 
5 In 2005 the Japanese Antimonopoly Monopoly Act was amended to give compulsory investigatory powers to the 
Free Trade Commission. See Mitsuo Matsushito, ‘Reforming the Enforcement of the Japanese Antimonopoly 
Law’  (2010) 41 Loyola University Chicago Law Review 521; http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/18/33723798.pdf; 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/18/33723798.pdf.  In 2009, Japan criminally convicted six former executives for 
cartel offenses.  Also in 2009, Japan increased the maximum prison sentence for unfair restrictions from three 
years to five years. See: http://www.omm.com/newsroom/publication.aspx?pub=865.  For the Japanese Law 
Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade, see 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_guidelines/index.html. For a good concise overview of the cartel landscape in 
Japan, see http://www.iclg.co.uk/practice-areas/cartels-and-leniency/cartels-&-leniency-2013/japan. 
6 In France, enforcement under the competition acts of 1953 and 1958 were exclusively criminal. The laws were 
reformed in 1977 and again in 1986 which introduced the present French system which relies mostly on 
administrative sanctions; however, criminal sanctions are still available. See: 
http://www.pspe.org.pl/dokumenty/137_IsCriminalizationofEUCompetitionLawtheAnswer.pdf. 
For the Commercial Code see: http://195.83.177.9/code/liste.phtml?lang=uk&c=32&r=3096. The statute of 
limitations was extended in 2001, theoretically making it more feasible to criminally prosecute cartel cases. 
See: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/60/31415943.pdf. See also: 
http://www.pspe.org.pl/dokumenty/137_IsCriminalizationofEUCompetitionLawtheAnswer.pdf; ABA SECTION 
OF ANTITRUST LAW, Competition Laws Outside the United States, 2D 2011.  
7 Section 168b of the Austrian Criminal Code criminalizes bid rigging; however, before the Competition Law was 
amended in 2002 Austria could impose criminal penalties for other cartel conduct. See: 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4095.pdf.  According to a general provision, section 37, a fine 
could be placed instead of the prison sentence for bid rigging. For the Criminal Code (in German) see: 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10002296.  
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8 Typical maximum imprisonment in Norway is 3 years; however, the maximum becomes 6 years for aggregating 
circumstances. In practice, authorities have only applied fines. For the Competition Act of 2004 see: 
http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/en/legislation/The-Competition-Act-of-2004/. 
For the Competition Act of 1993 see: http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/en/legislation/The-Competition-Act-of-
1993/. An Act to Control Monopolistic Practices and Unwarranted Prices of 1926, see: ANTI-TRUST LAWS 281 (W. 
Friedman ed., 1956). 
9 While there were a few criminal cases in the early 1980s, the Israeli Antitrust Law (both the 1959 and 1988 
version) was not significantly enforced until the Israeli Antitrust Authority (IAA) was created in 1994. See: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/37/2488835.pdf. In the early 2000s the IAA went further by requesting the court 
to impose actual imprisonment, which the court imposed against the tile cartel. Email from Mazor Matzkevich of 
Epstein, Chomsky, Osnat & Co. Law Offices, July 10, 2011.The amount of criminal charges and the severity of 
the punishments increased in the late 1990s and early 2000s. See: 
http://www.fbclawyers.com/FileServer/979d371dcfce94ade7ce2277174b2106.pdf. 
The typical maximum imprisonment is 3 years unless certain defined aggravating factors are present, in which case 
the maximum is 5 years. For the Restrictive Trade Practices Law see: http://eng-
archive.antitrust.gov.il/ANTSearchItems.aspx?Subject=100209. See also: 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4110.pdf. 
10Additionally, debarment and a general prohibition to contract with public administrations of between 3 and 5 years 
can be imposed. For the Spanish Competition Act, see: 
http://www.cncompetencia.es/Inicio/GestionDocumental/tabid/76/Default.aspx?EntryId=18425&Command=Core
_Download&Method=attachment. Article 262 of the Spanish Penal Code criminalizes bid rigging in auctions and 
public tenders. Article 284 of the Spanish Penal Code criminalizes other types of cartels. For the Spanish Penal 




DF. See also: http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/3365.pdf and JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI, WORLD 
LAW OF COMPETITION OVERVIEW § 1.15[1] (1987). 
11 Greece recently enacted a new Competition Act (Law 3959/2011) which replaced Law 703/1977, and which 
created stiffer sentences focused on cartel offenses. For the new law (in Greek) see: 
http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/bcc26661-143b-4f2d-8916-0e0e66ba4c50/p-proant-pap.pdf. The 
previous Competition Act (Law 703/1977) provided for criminal fines. The initial text of the 1977 law also 
provided for imprisonment (of at least three months) for cartel violations, but (to our knowledge) no one was ever 
sentenced under it, and it was subsequently abolished until the sanction of imprisonment was re-introduced in 




12 In 1999, the Korean Omnibus Cartel Repeal Act removed legal exemptions for 20 cartels. See: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/3/44/2497300.pdf. While civil penalties have become increasingly common, 
criminal enforcement is still relatively rare. See: http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4113.pdf. In 
2008, the Korean Free Trade Commission (KFTC) began to forward cartel offenders to the Korean Prosecutor's 
Office for criminal prosecution.  See: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515.htm#N_35_. The Korean 
Supreme Court has ruled that the KFTC must first recommend criminal charges to the Prosecutors Office for such 
charges to be valid. See: 
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/AT307000/otherlinks_files/at307000_newsletter_201103.pdf. 
For the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act see: 
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/files/static/Legal_Authority/Monopoly%20Regulation%20and%20Fair%20Trade%20Act_Aug
%203%202007.pdf. 
13 For the Kenyan Competition Act 2010 see: 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/CompetitionAct_No12of2010_.doc. For the 
Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and Price Control Act 1988 see: 
http://www.treasury.go.ke/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&Itemid=54&gid=68&orderby=dmdat
e_published&ascdesc=DESC. See also: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/44/1832315.pdf. 
14 While the Brazilian Antitrust Law was originally passed in 1994, it was amended and strengthened both in 2000 
and 2007. Brazilian competition authorities did not begin to focus on anti-cartel enforcement until 2003.   
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For the Brazilian Antitrust Law see: http://www.seae.fazenda.gov.br/document_center/legislation/brazilian-antitrust-
law.pdf. See also: 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/index.php?area=4&country_results=1&kh_publications_id=171&chapters_id=4097; 
http://www.heinonline.org.ezp1.lib.umn.edu/HOL/Page?page=929&handle=hein.journals/antibull40&collection=j
ournals; and http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/42/45154362.pdf. 
15 The current Taiwanese Competition Law only allows for criminal punishment for repeat offenders. For the Fair 
Trade Act of 2010, see: http://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=644&docid=11057.  
The Fair Trade Act of 1992 (enacted in 1991) allowed for the same criminal punishments to non-repeat offenders. 
See: http://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=644&docid=1555.  For the Fair Trade Act of 
1999, see: http://www.ftc.gov.tw/internet/english/doc/docDetail.aspx?uid=644&docid=1554. See 
also: http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/05/APECTrainingProgram2003/LINGin.pdf; and http://www.worldservicesgroup
.com/publications.asp?action=article&artid=1709.  Taiwan introduced a leniency program in 2011 and announced 
its first decision under the program in late 2012.  See 
http://www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/71263/competition-law-developments-in-east-asia-september-
2012. 
16 For the Icelandic Competition Law No. 44/2005 see: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=190678. 
 For the Competition Law No. 8/1993 see: 
http://www.idnadarraduneyti.is/log-og-reglugerdir/Allar_Reglugerdir/nr/102. See also: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/31/2404778.pdf. 
17 The normal maximum punishment is three years in prison; however, if a competitor suffers serious damage then 
the penalty is two to six years of prison. See Section 250 of Penal Code (in Slovakian): 
http://www.zbierka.sk/Dokumenty/Download/37/Default.aspx. 
For the Slovak Act on Protection of Competition see: http://www.antimon.gov.sk/files/30/2009/Act%20136-2001-
novela-aj.rtf. To date, no criminal charges have been brought by Slovakia’s authorities. See: 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4122.pdf.  
18 The Zambian Competition and Consumer Protection Act 2010 per se criminalizes all horizontal agreements. See: 
http://www.parliament.gov.zm/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=714. 
For The Competition and Fair Trading Act of 1994 see: 
http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/africa/Zambia/COMPETITION%20anDFAIR%20TRADING%2
0ACT.PDF. For an explanation about the fine system see: http://www.zra.org.zm/Penalties.php. 
19 Cartels in Slovenia were originally incriminated in 1995 when the Criminal Code was enacted; however, the 
effectiveness was diminished because of its poor definition. In 2008, a new Criminal Code was enacted which 
substantially amended the wording to its current form in Article 225. See: 
http://www.policija.si/eng/images/stories/Legislation/pdf/CriminalCode2009.pdf. To our knowledge, no one has 
been criminally prosecuted for a hard core offense, although in 2010 the Competition Protection Office provided 
documents to the state prosecutor regarding a cartel of Slovenian operators of ski lifts accused of fixing the prices 
of ski tickets for ten years. Email from Tjaša Lahovnik of Odvetniki Šelih & partnerji law firm, June 21, 2011. For 




20 The Irish Competition Act of 2002 increased maximum fines and imprisonment. See: 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2002/en/act/pub/0014/print.html#partii-sec11. See also: 
http://www.calvani.com/TerrysFiles/Articles/Irish%20Cartel%20Enforcement-Fordham%202004.pdf; and 
http://www.tara.tcd.ie/bitstream/2262/11978/1/LyonsP0507.pdf.  In 2006, Ireland became the first EU country to 
impose a prison sentence for a cartel activity besides bid rigging. See: http://www.efc.ie/full-
publications.php?id_publications=99.  At the end of 2010, there had been 33 criminal convictions (18 undertakings 
and 15 individuals) for hard core cartel offenses. See: 
http://www.tca.ie/images/uploaded/documents/2010%20Annual%20Report.pdf. 




and&TemplateName=predoc.tmpl&setCookie=1.  In July 2012, amendments to the Competition Act came into 
force that, inter alia, doubled potential prison time to ten years.: Peter Whelan, ‘Ireland Offers a Glimmer of Hope 
for European Cartel Criminalisation’ (Competition Policy Blog, 26 July 26  2012)   
                                                                                                                                                             




21 The Romanian Competition Law criminalizes actions with a “fraudulent intent and in a decisive way” and calls 
for punishment in the form of either imprisonment or criminal fines. See Article 63: 
http://www.competition.ro/documente/en/l21_1996_mod.pdf. A new Criminal Code has been enacted but the date 
for its entry has not gone into force as of July 22, 2011.  The new Code will change criminal fines from its current 
form listed in the table above to a minimum of 180 fine-days and a maximum of 300 fine-days (a fine-day may 
range from RON 10-500). Email from Georgeta Harapcea of Nestor Nestor Diculescu Kingston Peterse law firm 
July 22, 2011. 
Also, see: http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4121.pdf; 
http://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/documente/Raport%202010%20final_19510ro.pdf; and  
ROMANIA IN TRANSITION 176 (Lavinia Stan ed. 1997).  
22 In 2010, Russian officials began criminal proceeding against a large coal cartel. See: 





See also: http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/3361.pdf. 
23 The Danish Competition Act refers to Part 10 of the Criminal Code which lays out general guidelines for judges 
imposing criminal fines which (for our purposes) apply to agreements in violation of EU and Danish competition 
law. See: 
http://www.konkurrencestyrelsen.dk/fileadmin/webmasterfiles/konkurrence/Fusionskontrol/Consolidated_Act_No.
_1027_of_21_August_2007_as_amended_as_of_1_October_2010.pdf. See also: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/27/18/34767708.pdf; http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/culture/papers/iversen09.pdf; 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/index.php?area=4&country_results=1&kh_publications_id=126&chapters_id=3307; and 
JULIAN O. VON KALINOWSKI, WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION OVERVIEW § 1.09][1] (1987). 
24 In 1997, Section 298 was added to the German Criminal Code which specifically criminalized bid rigging in 
tender proceedings. See: http://www.antitrust.de/. Before that, in 1992, the criminal courts had begun applying the 
general fraud provision to bid rigging cartels. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1584887http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1
584887From 1998 to 2008, there were over 260 indictments and 180 convictions for bid rigging. See: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1584887. For the Act Against Restraints of Competition see: 
http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GWB.htm. See also: 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/3317.pdf; and 
http://www.jstor.org.ezp2.lib.umn.edu/stable/1891098. 
25 The Indonesian Law on Prohibition Against Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition calls for 
criminal fines or imprisonment in lieu of fines. See: http://www.cipatent.com/unfairlaw.pdf. See also: 
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/csis/publications/Oct18.pdf; and http://eng.kppu.go.id/wp-
content/uploads/2010/04/performance_report_2009.pdf. 
26 Thai authorities have recently discussed overhauling the Competition Act because it has been criticized as 
ineffective. See: http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=8608&nid=6; and 
http://www.thailawforum.com/articles/Competition-law.html. For the Act see: 
http://gis.dit.go.th/otcc/upload/TradeAct.pdf. See also: http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/b29ae69f-
c3d2-484f-9b5a-49bde68ad16b/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/a5dd9d43-9f25-4ea1-97aa-
4c90a362d5b0/Thai_Competition_Law.pdf. 
27 The Barbados Fair Competition Act states that the Fair Trade Commission must notify the parties whose 
agreement or trade practice is anticompetitive before prosecution. Only if a person fails to terminate the offending 
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=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=39&Itemid=89http://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?option=com_content&tas
k=blogcategory&id=39&Itemid=89. For the Act, see: http://www.ftc.gov.bb/library/CAP326C.pdf.  
28 Section 400 of the Estonian Penal Code, which imposes criminal sanctions for actions preventing free 
competition, was enacted in 2002 and amended in 2010.  From 2008 to 2009, 14 criminal procedures were brought 
against hard core cartels. See: http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/public/AnnualReports_/Annual_Report_2009.pdf; 
and http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/file.php?14445. For the Competition Act, see: 
http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/public/competition_act_july_2006.pdf. See also: 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/3309.pdf;http://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/public/AnnualReports_/
Annual_Report_2009.pdfhttp://www.konkurentsiamet.ee/public/AnnualReports_/Annual_Report_2009.pdf. 
29 The British Enterprise Act makes it a criminal offence only if an individual dishonestly agrees with one or more 
other persons to make or implement, or to cause to be made or implemented, arrangements between at least two 
undertakings involving any of the following: price fixing, market sharing, limiting supply or production, and bid 
rigging. See: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/contents; http://www.oft.gov.uk/about-the-oft/legal-
powers/legal/competition-act-1998/; http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4130.pdf; and 
http://ld.practicallaw.com/2-504-4903#a996632.. 
30 In 2005, Article 296/B was added to the Hungarian Criminal Code, criminalizing cartels in public procurement 
procedures and concession tenders. See: http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/hu/hu019en.pdf. 
For the Hungarian Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive Market Prices 1997 see: 
http://www.gvh.hu/gvh/alpha?do=2&st=2&pg=129&m5_doc=4244&m176_act=2. 
For the Act LXXXVII of 1990 on Price Setting see: 
http://www.gvh.hu/domain2/files/modules/module25/pdf/Jogi_Magyar_Egyeb_torveny_Artorveny_a.pdf 
See also: http://www.iclg.co.uk/index.php?area=4&country_results=1&kh_publications_id=126&chapters_id=3320; 
and http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/mjil15&div=30&g_sent=1&collection=journals. 
31 For the Australian Competition and Consumer Act see: http://www.australiancompetitionlaw.org/overview.html. 
See also: http://www.australiancompetitionlaw.org/legislation/1906aipa.html; and 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4094.pdf. 
32 In 2009, the Czech Criminal Code was revised and added Article 248, making participation in a cartel an explicit 
criminal offense. See: http://www.schoenherr.eu/news-
publications/pdfs/schoenherr%20public%20competition%20enforcement%20review%20czechrepublic; and 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/index.php?area=4&country_results=1&kh_publications_id=126&chapters_id=3306. 
Imprisonment is available only if the damage or profit of the acting person was above 5 Mio CZK or the cartel led 
to the insolvency of a third party. Email from Arthur Braun of Braun law firm July 4, 2011. The Criminal Code 
(1961) Article 127 had generally criminalized breach of business rules and could have applied to competition 
laws; however, it was never used to convict someone who violated competition laws. See: 
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=77290.  
33 The South African Competition Amendment Act was amended in 2009 to include criminal liability; however, the 
Act provides that the President can determine when it enters into force, and as of the close of 2012, it has not yet 
come into force. See: http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/4124.pdf. 
34 Article 234 of Mexico’s current Competition Law criminalizes cartels. See: 
http://www.cfc.gob.mx/images/stories/Leyes/compendio2011conreformas.pdf; and 
http://www.mexico.vg/mexicos-economy/calderon-competition-law/4500. The 1857 Mexican Constitution 
contained a provision which banned monopolies. Antitrust statues were first passed in 1924, 1931, and 1934. See: 
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, Competition Laws Outside the United States, 2D 2011.  
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